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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The ability to infer another person’s emotions from his or her intention is closely 
developed around the ability to understand false beliefs, the key Theory of Mind 
(ToM) ability. False belief understanding is acquired at the age of 4- to 5-years and is 
supposed to be an indicator of representational understanding (for reviews on ToM in 
developmental psychology see Astington, 1993; Perner, 1991b; Sodian & Thoermer, 
2006; Wellman, 1990; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). By the age of 2½ to 4 
years, children begin to attribute emotions based on processing simple intention-
outcome-relations. Inferring emotions from simple intention-outcome-relations is 
assumed to not require representational operations (Astington, 1999a; Astington, 
2001b; Baird & Astington, 2005; Perner, 1991a). From the age of six to seven years, 
children begin to properly integrate others’ immoral intentions into intention-
outcome relations. Developmental evidence indicates that the ability to infer 
emotions from other’s immoral intentions is based on the development of 
representational understanding (Baird & Astington, 2004; Sokol, 2004; Sokol & 
Chandler, 2004; Sokol, Chandler, & Jones, 2004). This thesis is the first that 
investigates the neural correlates associated with inferring emotions based on mental 
states such as intentions. By identifying the brain regions associated with intention-
based emotion attribution, functional neuroimaging can help clarify whether 
intention-based emotion attribution is associated with common or distinct neural 
networks relative to false belief understanding.  
Because false belief processing is the key ToM ability, until now the majority of 
neuroimaging studies have concentrated on exploring the neural correlates associated 
with false belief understanding (for reviews on neuroimaging evidence on false belief 
understanding see Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2003; 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe, 2006; Saxe & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Saxe, Carey, & 
Kanwisher, 2004). Other neuroimaging studies have explored the attribution of 
mental states such as intentions (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2000; 
Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & 
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Haxby, 2007; Martin & Weisberg, 2003; Schultz, 2005; Tavares, Lawrence, & 
Barnard, 2008; Walter et al., 2004), or emotions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; 
Heberlein, Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2004; Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006; 
Ochsner et al., 2004; Ruby & Decety, 2004; Schulte-Ruther, Markowitsch, Fink, & 
Piefke, 2007; Wicker, Perrett, Baron-Cohen, & Decety, 2003). These studies, 
however, have explored mental state attribution based on physical cues. A full ToM 
understanding, however, requires the prediction and explanation of others’ 
behaviour, including their emotional reactions, independent of physical cues, that is, 
solely on inferring behaviour from mental cues. This criterion is fulfilled for emotion 
attribution based on mental states such as intentions.  
To explore intention-based emotion attribution in healthy adults, two experiments 
were conducted. In both experiments nonverbal stories with verbal vignettes were 
presented, which were adopted from developmental studies on intention-based 
emotion attribution (Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & van den Ende, 1996). The 
nonverbal material was held equivalent across the experimental conditions, which 
only differed in their verbal vignettes. Experiment 1 concentrates on emotion 
attribution based on processing simple intention-outcome-relations, in which an 
actor’s intention either matched or mismatched the outcome situation. By realizing a 
2 by 2 factorial design, experiment 2 investigates emotion attribution based on 
integrating an actor’s immoral intention into intention-outcome-relations. Here, the 
factor intention varied on whether the protagonist held a neutral or immoral 
intention. Analogous to experiment 1 the factor ‘intention-outcome-relation’ in 
experiment 2 varied on whether the protagonist’s intention matched or mismatched 
the outcome situation. In both experiments, besides emotion attribution conditions, a 
non-mental control condition was used that solely described physical processes. The 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) analysis focussed on the emotion 
attribution cue. 
In chapter 1 the experiment 1 is introduced, followed by a method, result, and 
discussion part (chapters 2 to 4). In chapter 5 the experiment 2 is introduced, 
followed by a method, result, and discussion part (chapters 6 to 8). Further, the thesis 
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contains a general discussion and perspectives on future research (chapter 9). Finally, 
the thesis is concluded with a summary (chapter 10). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
STUDY I  
EMOTIONS INFERRED FROM INTENTION-OUTCOME-RELATIONS 
 
 
The aim of experiment one is to investigate the neural correlates associated with the 
processing of emotions inferred from intention-outcome-relations. This ability is 
developed shortly before the ability to understand false beliefs, that is, between 2½ 
and 4 years of age. Developmental findings on the processing of intention-outcome-
relations are summarized in chapter 1.1, followed by a review of the neural network 
involved in Theory of Mind (chapter 1.2). Finally, the introduction of experiment one 
concludes with a summary and a deduction of the research question (chapter 1.3). 
 
1.1 Developmental findings on the processing of intention-outcome 
relations 
By the age of 2½ to 4 years children judge a person holding a neutral intention as 
feeling happy when a desired goal is fulfilled and as feeling sad when the desired 
goal is not fulfilled (Astington, 1999a; Feinfield, Lee, Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 
1999; Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Lagattuta, 2005; Stein & Levine, 1989; Wellman & 
Banerjee, 1991; Wellman & Woolley, 1990; Yuill, 1984; Yuill et al., 1996). 
However, 2½ - to 4-years-olds’ understanding of mental states is a rather limited one. 
They have not yet acquired the concept that mental states belong to persons, 
independent of situations. Rather, they process others’ mental states as being 
(objectively) bound to situations than being (subjectively) associated with a person. 
Developmental psychologists assume that when 2½- to 4-years-old attribute 
emotions based on intention-outcome situations, they rely on a matching strategy, 
that is, they infer an actor’s emotion by matching the factual outcome situation with 
the hypothetical ‘intended situation’ (Astington, 1999a; Astington, 2001b; Baird & 
Astington, 2005; Perner, 1991a). Specifically, in the case where an actor’s ‘intended 
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situation’ matches the outcome situation, the actor is judged to feel good (e.g. 
intended situation: Max wants to throw the ball to Anna; outcome situation: Max 
throws the ball to Anna). In contrast, when there is a mismatch between the ‘intended 
situation’ and the outcome situation, the actor is judged to feel sad (e.g. intended 
situation: Max wants to throw the ball to Anna; outcome situation: Max throws the 
ball to Tim). 
There is much empirical evidence which underpins the assumption that 2½- to 4-
year-olds’ ability for emotion attribution is limited to an intention-outcome-matching 
strategy. First, Yuill (1984) investigated whether young children could integrate an 
actor’s immoral intention into intention-outcome-relations. The author presented 
picture stories that depicted an actor’s intention, an action, and an outcome. The 
actor’s intention varied on the dimensions neutral (e.g., [an actor] wants to throw the 
ball to person A) and immoral (e.g., [an actor] wants to hit person A with the ball). 
The outcome either matched (e.g., neutral intention: person A catches the ball; 
immoral intention: person A is hit by the ball), or mismatched the actor’s intention. 
In cases of an intention-outcome mismatch, the actor’s intention either mismatched 
the outcome with respect to the recipient  (mismatch-recipient; neutral intention: 
person B [instead of person A] catches the ball; immoral intention: person B [instead 
of person A] is hit by the ball), or with respect to the value of the actor’s intention 
(mismatch-value; neutral intention: person A is hit by the ball [instead of catching 
the ball]; immoral intention: person A catches the ball [instead of being hit by the 
ball]). Children had to judge the actor’s satisfaction and had to perform morality 
judgements. With respect to satisfaction judgements, the author assumed that for 
both neutral and immoral intentions, children would attribute positive emotions to an 
actor who fulfilled its intention. In contrast, an actor whose intention did not match 
the intended outcome was supposed to be judged to feel sad. With respect to morality 
judgements, Yuill (1984) assumed that when reasoning about moral values, a 
wrongdoer had to be judged worse than a ‘neutral’ actor regardless of the outcome. 
Regarding satisfaction judgments, 3-year-olds, as did 5- and 7-year-olds, 
appropriately judged an actor holding a neutral intention as more satisfied in 
situations were its neutral intention matches the outcome compared to situations 
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where the outcome mismatches the actor’s intention. Interestingly, 3-years-olds did 
not show that distinction for immoral intentions. They judged an actor who fulfilled 
his or her immoral intention feeling as sad as an actor whose immoral intention was 
not fulfilled. With respect to morality judgements, 5- and 7-year-olds appropriately 
judged a wrongdoer worse than an actor holding a neutral intention, irrespective of 
the outcome situation. Interestingly, 3-year-olds’ morality judgements were related to 
the outcome scenario. For example, victimizers who accidentally caused a neutral 
outcome were not judged worse than neutral actors who accidentally caused a 
negative outcome. Moreover, neutral actors causing harm accidentally were judged 
worse than neutral actors causing no harm. Furthermore, wrongdoers who 
accidentally caused a neutral outcome were judged to be better than wrongdoers who 
accidentally hurt the wrong recipient. The results provide evidence that 3-year-olds’ 
ability to integrate an actor’s immoral intention into the processing of intention-
outcome-relations are primarily based on processing an intention in relation to 
outcome cues (outcome orientation) rather than processing an intention as being a 
person’s mental state, independent of the outcome.  
These results were confirmed by another study (Yuill et al., 1996) that presented 
stories similar to the stories given in the study of Yuill (1984). In this study, 3-year-
olds also gave outcome-oriented responses to wrongdoers, that is, wrongdoers were 
judged to feel sad, regardless of whether its immoral intention resulted in goal 
attainment or not. Moreover, Yuill et al. (1996) showed a developmental trend with 
respect to intention-based emotion attribution from taking an objective stance in 3-
year-olds (children’s emotion attribution responses referred to the outcome) to taking 
a subjective stance in 5- to 7-year-olds (children’s emotion attribution responses 
referred to the actor’s intention) to taking a moral stance in 10-year-olds (children’s 
emotion attribution responses contained moral considerations; for a review on the 
literature investigating young children’s happy victimizer patterns see chapter 5.1). 
Taking a subjective stance in 5- to 7-year-olds resulted in the attribution of positive 
emotions to a wrongdoer, that is, emotion judgements were oriented towards goal 
attainment, irrespective of moral transgression. Taking a moral stance in 10-year-
olds were based on mixed emotion patterns, that is, feeling both bad at the moral 
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transgression and good at having attained the desired goal. In another experiment, the 
authors reasoned that as soon as children can take a subjective stance in addition to 
an objective stance they can learn to integrate both stances. The authors assumed that 
this should result in the ability to develop a moral stance, which is supposed to be 
based on both subjective (goal attainment) and objective considerations (moral 
transgression). The authors assumed that not before the age of five children should 
be able to flexibly switch between stances, because before age five children are 
supposed to be only capable of the objective stance. To test these assumptions, the 
authors manipulated different stances by asking children morally (e.g., ‘Was that a 
good or bad thing for [the actor] to do?’) or personally salient questions (e.g., ‘Was 
that what [the actor] wanted to happen or not what [the actor] wanted to happen?’) 
before they asked children the emotion attribution questions based on the intention-
outcome stories described above. Interestingly, while 5-year-olds’ judgements varied 
by the stance manipulations, 3-year-olds’ judgements did not. That is, while 5-year-
olds judged a wrongdoer whose immoral goal was attained less happy in the moral 
salience condition than in the personal salience conditions, 3-year-olds did not show 
such an effect. These results suggest that 3-year-olds’ ability to process mental states 
such as intentions are yet bound to situations rather than to persons since they are not 
capable to switch between a subjective and a moral stance. 
A second argument for the assumption that 2½- to 4-year-olds attribute emotion 
by an intention-outcome-matching strategy comes from empirical evidence that 3- to 
4-years-olds have difficulties in dealing with belief-based emotion attribution tasks 
(Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). For example, Hadwin & 
Perner (1991) explored whether 3- to 4-year-olds would be able to reason about 
emotions such as happiness and surprise. While happiness is more the consequence 
of intention-outcome-relations, surprise is rather a consequence of belief-outcome-
relations. Similar to the stories presented in Yuill (1984), children had to attribute 
emotions to a character based on either intention-outcome-relations (e.g., intention: 
[an actor] wants to throw the ball to Person A; outcome match: Person A catches the 
ball; outcome mismatch: Person B catches the ball) or based on belief-outcome-
relations (e.g., belief: [an actor] believes that person A has the ball; belief-outcome 
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match (true belief): person A has the ball; belief-outcome mismatch (false belief): 
person B has the ball). With respect to the intention-outcome stories, the authors 
reasoned that an actor should be judged to feel happy in cases of goal attainment, and 
to feel unhappy in cases of missing a desired goal. Regarding the belief-outcome 
scenarios, an actor should be judged to feel surprised in situations where his or her 
belief mismatches the outcome. In contrast, the character should be judged as not 
being surprised in cases where the belief matches the outcome. Three- to four-year-
olds managed to attribute happiness to the actor in situations where a desired 
outcome was reached and unhappiness in stories where the desire was unfulfilled. 
Interestingly, 3- to 4-year-olds performed at chance in judging a character as not 
being surprised in belief-outcome-match stories and as being surprised in belief-
outcome-mismatch trials. 
These results were confirmed in another study on belief-based emotion attribution 
(Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). The authors presented belief-desire-outcome stories to 
3-year-olds and explored their ability to attribute to an actor the more desire-based 
emotion happiness and the more belief-based emotion surprise. For example, one 
situation type depicted a protagonist who wants sunshine (desire), thinks that it will 
rain (belief), and it finally rains (outcome). This situation was designed as depicting a 
desire that mismatched the outcome and a belief that matched the outcome; hence 
unhappiness and no surprise should be attributed. Another story type depicted an 
actor who, for example, wants a goldfish (desire), thinks that he will get a goldfish 
(belief), and finally obtains a cow (outcome). Here, the correct emotion pattern 
would be unhappiness with respect to a desire that mismatches the outcome, and 
surprise with respect to a belief-outcome-mismatch. A third scenario required 
happiness judgements with respect to a desire that matches the outcome and surprise 
judgements based on belief-outcome-mismatch: for example, a character wants grape 
juice (desire), thinks that he will get milk (belief), and finally gets grape juice 
(outcome). Regarding reasoning about desire-outcome-relations, 3-year-olds 
correctly attributed happiness to desire match situations and unhappiness to desire 
mismatch situations. However, they showed less competence in correctly attributing 
the belief-dependent emotion surprise. These findings were further supported by 
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another experiment. Wellman & Banerjee (1991) reasoned whether an emotion 
explanation method would be a more sensitive instrument to measure 3-year-olds’ 
ability in belief-based emotion attribution. They presented the same stories as 
described above, but children did not need to infer the appropriate emotion. Instead, 
the appropriate emotion was presented to the child after story presentation. The child 
was then asked to explain why the actor was feeling this way. Responses were 
categorized into desire and belief-based responses. Interestingly, even with a more 
sensitive measure, the 3-year-olds’ lack in belief-based emotion attribution remained. 
Three-year-olds’ responses did not differentiate with respect to the more desire-based 
emotion happiness and the more belief-based emotion surprise. Furthermore, they 
showed a bias for desire-based responses since for both happiness and surprise they 
gave more desire-based responses. In addition, belief-based responses were rarely 
given.  
A third argument for the assumption that 2½- to 4-year-olds attribute emotion 
based on an intention-outcome-matching strategy comes from empirical evidence 
that 3- to 4-year-olds show less competence in reasoning about intentions in cases 
where intentions are not directly related to a situation (Feinfield et al., 1999; Schult, 
2002). Feinfield et al. (1999) presented stories to 3-year-olds in which an actor’s 
intention (e.g., going to the football stadium for their mother’s sake) mismatched 
both that actor’s desire (e.g., going to the mountains for their own sake) and the 
desired outcome (e.g., bus gets lost and ends up at the mountains). The authors 
assumed that in order to identify the actor’s intention, the children had to process the 
intention independent of both the desire and the desired outcome. The authors 
reasoned that in such scenarios, intention processing would require taking a 
subjective stance rather than an objective stance. Three-year-olds showed 
competence in reasoning about the actor’s desire (‘Where does [the actor] like to 
go?’; correct answer: ‘to the mountains’). Compared to 4-year-olds, however, 3-year-
olds showed less competence in reasoning about the actor’s intention (‘Where did 
[the actor] try do go?’; ‘Where did [the actor] think he was going to go?’; correct 
answer: ‘to the football stadium’). As a methodological limitation, Astington (2001) 
points out that in Feinfield et al.’s (1999) study, intentions could have been inferred 
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by a matching-strategy as well, because desires and intention were not causally 
linked to the same outcome. The character’s intention was linked to the goal to go 
the football stadium in order to follow his mother’s wishes. His desire, however, was 
linked to a different goal, that is, to go to the mountains. Therefore, Astington (2001) 
argues that although the intention mismatches the desired goal, it matches the 
intended goal. In order to explore whether intentions are understood independent of 
the outcome, a better way to distinguish intentions and desire would be to present 
scenarios where both intentions and desires are related to the same goal, whereas 
there is a match between desire and goal and a mismatch between intention and that 
goal. Schult (2002) realized such scenarios by presenting 4-, 5-, 7-year-olds and 
adults picture stories in which an actor’s desire was fulfilled, however, it was 
fulfilled in an unintended fashion (e.g., desire: Becky wants to have a doll; intention: 
Becky plans to buy herself that doll; outcome (desire fulfilled / intention unfulfilled): 
Becky’s mother gave her the doll). While 5-, 7-year-olds and adults could distinguish 
between the actor’s desire (‘Did Becky get what she wanted?’; correct answer: ‘yes’) 
and the actor’s intention (‘Did Becky do what she planned to do?’; correct answer: 
‘no’), 4-year-olds could correctly answer the desire question, but, performed at 
chance with respect to the intention question.  
A fourth argument for the assumption that 2½- to 4-year-olds attribute emotion by 
an intention-outcome-matching strategy comes from empirical evidence which 
indicates that when the matching strategy between the intention and the outcome is 
not made salient, 3-year-olds show a lack in competence in reasoning about the 
character’s intention (Astington, 1999a; Baird & Moses, 2002). For example, 
Astington (1999) contrasted an implicit intention-outcome condition (e.g., ‘Ernie has 
some bread. He takes it outside. He throws crumbs down. The birds pick them up.’) 
with an unintended, accidental, condition (e.g., ‘Bert’s got some bread too. He walks 
along eating it. Some crumbs fall behind him. The birds pick them up.’), and with an 
explicit intention-outcome control story where intention and outcome were made 
salient. Three types of test questions were asked. The ‘try question’ required the 
children to reason about an intention-in action (Searle, 1983), that is, an intention 
that an actor is actually carrying out (e.g., ‘Here’s Ernie, and here’s Bert. Which guy 
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tried to get the birds to eat crumbs?’; correct answer: ‘Ernie’) The authors reasoned 
that to answer this question appropriately, the intention has to be inferred from 
situational variables. The ‘meant question’ targeted on the prior-intention (Searle, 
1983), that is, an intention that an actor is actually not carrying out, but that he is 
going to carry out (e.g., ‘Here’s Ernie, and here’s Bert. Which guy meant the birds to 
eat the crumbs?’; correct answer: ‘Ernie’). Astington (1999) reasoned that prior-
intentions cannot be directly inferred from situational cues, but have to be processed 
independent of the reality state. Group differences were only found for the ‘meant 
question’ that was supposed to require reasoning about prior-intentions. Three-year-
olds were less likely to give appropriate answers than 4- and 5-year-olds. Based on 
these results, Astington (1999) assumes that 3-year-olds competence in intention-
based emotion attribution is rather based on matching different situations than on 
understanding the subjective nature of a mental state. Further evidence that children 
beyond 5 years of age have difficulties in processing intentions independent of 
reality cues comes from a recent study (Baird & Moses, 2002). The authors presented 
characters that had different desires (e.g., to be home for dinner vs. to be healthy and 
strong), but performed the same action (e.g., running). Four- and five-year-olds were 
asked for the character’s intention (e.g., to get somewhere fast vs. to get some 
exercise). While 5-year-olds correctly attributed different intentions despite the same 
actions, 4-year-olds performed at chance with respect to intention attribution. 
In sum, there is strong evidence that 2½- to 4-year-olds perform intention-based 
emotion attribution tasks based on an objective stance, that is, by processing an 
intention in relation to an outcome situation rather than based on a subjective stance, 
that is, by processing an intention independent of reality cues (Astington, 1999a; 
Astington, 2001b; Baird & Astington, 2005; Perner, 1991a). Although 2½- to 4-year-
olds appropriately attribute emotions based on a neutral intention, they show less 
competence in tasks where a subjective stance is supposed to be more effective, that 
is, they show inappropriate emotion responses for immoral intentions (Yuill, 1984; 
Yuill et al., 1996), do not successfully handle belief-based emotion attribution tasks 
(Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991), and show less competence in 
reasoning about intentions in cases where intentions are not directly related to a 
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situation (Feinfield et al., 1999; Schult, 2002). Finally, they show less competence 
when the intention-outcome-relation is not made salient (Astington, 1999a; Baird & 
Moses, 2002). The ability to attribute emotions based on intention-outcome-relations 
shortly precedes the acquirement of false belief reasoning. Therefore, developmental 
findings suggest distinct rather than common neural networks, since there seems to 
be a change in mental state understanding from taking an objective stance in 2½- to 
4-year-olds to taking a subjective stance above age 4. However, direct evidence is 
still lacking. The following chapters review neuroimaging findings on the ToM 
network. 
 
1.2 Neuroimaging findings on Theory of Mind 
Neuroimaging can help address the question of whether there are distinct or common 
neuronal networks associated with false belief understanding and intention-based 
emotion attribution. To date, there are many neuroimaging studies on false belief 
understanding and on inferring mental states from physical cues, an ability that 
develops much earlier than false belief understanding and intention-based emotion 
attribution. This is the first study that investigates the functional basis of emotion 
attribution based on intention-outcome-relations, an ability that shortly precedes the 
development of false belief understanding. Chapter 1.2 starts by reviewing 
neuroimaging findings on false belief reasoning (chapter 1.2.1), followed by 
neuroimaging evidence on intention attribution (chapter 1.2.2) and emotion 
attribution (chapter 1.2.3).  
 
1.2.1  False belief reasoning 
The false belief task originally designed by Wimmer & Perner (1983) is the critical 
test to assess whether a person has a Theory of Mind (ToM), since it requires one to 
understand that people act according to their beliefs, independent of the state of 
reality. Critically, false belief reasoning is based on understanding that a person’s 
false representation about reality is believed to be a true representation about reality 
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by that person. In order to differentiate these two mental representations of reality, 
the true belief I hold and the false belief the other holds, one is supposed to require 
the ability to represent mental states independent of reality (Perner, 1991b; Sodian & 
Thoermer, 2006).  
Initially, ToM research in neuroimaging was inspired by research on autism 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). It was robustly found that autistic children are 
significantly more likely to fail the false belief task than normally developing 
children (for reviews see Hill & Frith, 2003; Sodian, 2005). Based on this finding, it 
was argued that reasoning about false beliefs should be subserved by a brain region 
specifically associated with ToM (Frith & Frith, 1999). Since the false belief task is 
the critical test for having a ToM, most neuroimaging studies have concentrated on 
exploring the neural network associated with false belief reasoning. To explore the 
functional basis associated with false belief understanding, neuroscientist defined 
criteria a neural network should meet in order to be a candidate network for 
subserving ToM (Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Saxe et 
al., 2004; Stone & Gerrans, 2006). The functional circuitry involved in ToM should 
not only be necessary for processing ToM, but it should also be specialized for ToM. 
In other words, (1) the ToM network should respond to belief reasoning in general, 
both true and false beliefs, (2) the ToM network should show a significantly stronger 
response to mental states that require representation about mental states (e.g., false 
beliefs) compared to mental states that do not require representation about mental 
states (e.g., true beliefs), (3) the ToM network should show a significantly stronger 
response to representations about mental states (false beliefs) than to representations 
about physical states (e.g., false signs), (4) the ToM network should not differentiate 
between non-mental stories, regardless of whether they require representational 
abilities or not. Based on these criteria, two candidate brain regions were identified 
that are supposed to underlie the ToM network: the dorsal part of medial prefrontal 
cortex (DMPFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). While neuroscientists 
agree that both brain regions are involved in belief reasoning in general, there is still 
debate about which of the two brain regions is specifically associated with ToM (for 
reviews on neuroimaging evidence on false belief understanding see Amodio & 
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Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe, 
2006; Saxe & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Saxe et al., 2004). 
Researchers supporting the DMPFC as being necessarily and specifically 
associated with ToM presented stories and cartoons which required a mixture of 
mental state inferences (e.g., second-order false and true belief reasoning; lack of 
knowledge; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000). For example, in a PET 
study, Fletcher et al. (1995) presented stories that described a character who acts 
based on another character’s true or false belief. The belief stories were contrasted 
with physical stories, which described a character’s causal actions. As a baseline, 
vignettes of unlinked sentences were presented. Fletcher et al. (1995) observed that 
the DMPFC and the TPJ were involved in processing ToM stories compared to 
physical stories. In addition, while the authors did not observe DMPFC activity for 
physical stories compared to unlinked sentences, the TPJ was active for this contrast. 
Based on these findings, the authors argue for the DMPFC as subserving ToM 
because it was specifically active for the ToM stories. They further argued that the 
TPJ seems to be involved in more basic informational processes. These findings 
attained additional support by an fMRI study that presented both verbal and non-
verbal material (Gallagher et al., 2000). With respect to the verbal material, the 
authors presented the same stories as in the Fletcher et al. (1995) study. With respect 
to the nonverbal material, the authors presented cartoons that depicted a mixture of 
false beliefs and lack of knowledge. In the non-ToM cartoons, no inferences on false 
beliefs or lack of knowledge were required. In the baseline condition, subjects were 
required to decode scrambled pictures. The results were similar to the Fletcher et al. 
(1995) study. The DMPFC and the TPJ were found to be involved in both the ToM 
stories and the ToM cartoons, compared to the non-ToM trials. In addition, while 
there was no DMPFC activity for physical trials compared to unlinked trials, the TPJ 
was active for this contrast.  
Researchers who argue for a special role of the TPJ instead of the DMPFC in false 
belief understanding point out that, in addition to the ToM stimuli, the non-ToM 
material could have invited participants to engage on mental state reasoning because 
it depicts acting characters (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). The authors, therefore, point 
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out that the TPJ activity observed in the ‘non-ToM’ stories over the baseline trials 
could show that the TPJ is also involved in the ToM network. Further, it can be 
argued that the ToM stories were not controlled for first-order false belief reasoning 
because they required participants to engage in a mixture of mental state inferences 
(e.g., second-order false and true belief reasoning, lack of knowledge). When 
interpreting the results on a more conservative level, they show that both the TPJ and 
the DMPFC are involved in belief reasoning in general. However, whether there is a 
specific role for both or either brain region with respect to first-order false belief 
remains to be explored. 
Subsequent studies addressed the methodological shortcomings of the earlier 
studies and developed better-controlled material (Aichhorn et al., 2008; Perner et al., 
2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006; 
Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Sommer et al., 2007). For example, researchers who argue for 
a special role of the TPJ in false belief understanding contrasted first-order false 
belief stories with false photograph stories (Aichhorn et al., 2008; Perner et al., 2006; 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe et al., 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 
2005). While false belief stories are supposed to require participants to engage in 
representational activity about mental states, false photograph stories are supposed to 
be based on representations about physical states. This contrast could help clarify 
criterion 3 with respect to the ToM network: the ToM network should show a 
significantly stronger response to representations about mental states than to 
representations about physical states. For the false belief versus false photograph 
contrast the authors reported results both based on a whole brain analysis and on a 
functional region-of-interest analysis (fROI). Within the fROI analysis, to confirm a 
special role of the TPJ in false belief understanding, the authors analyzed several 
other contrasts in addition to the false belief versus false photograph contrast. They 
did not, however, report results for these fROI contrasts on a whole brain level. 
Contrasts that are based on fROI results, however, have to be confirmed on a whole 
brain level of analysis to be more reliable (Friston, Rotshtein, Geng, Sterzer, & 
Henson, 2006; Stone & Gerrans, 2006). Therefore, the fROI findings, which should 
support a special role of the TPJ in false belief understanding, can be questioned. 
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With respect to the whole brain results for the contrast false belief versus false 
photograph, Saxe and colleagues (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; 
Saxe et al., 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005), and Perner and colleagues (Aichhorn et al., 
2008; Perner et al., 2006) observed that both the DMPFC and the TPJ were found to 
be involved in false belief over false photograph trials. Although the assumption of a 
special role of the TPJ instead of the DMPFC has to be questioned, the whole brain 
results, however, could support criterion 3 with respect to the DMPFC and the TPJ, 
since both brain regions show a significantly stronger response to representations 
about mental states than to representations about physical states.  
Recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, however, shows that 
the false photograph task does not require a representational understanding (Perner & 
Leekam, 2008) because, unlike the false belief task, the false photo task does not 
require the computation of true / false perspective differences in relation to the same 
time point. That is because the physical photo content is related to something that has 
been true in the past. Therefore, the physical photo content does not have to be 
processed independent of reality cues. The false sign task is supposed to better 
control for a representational understanding because the physical sign content is 
manipulated to be false with respect to reality. Therefore, along with the false belief 
task, the false sign task is argued to require computing true / false perspective 
differences in relation to the same time point. In two fMRI studies, Perner and 
colleagues (Aichhorn et al., 2008; Perner et al., 2006) presented both the false photo 
and false sign condition as a control condition for the false belief task. In the false 
belief task Perner and colleagues presented verbal vignettes that described a present 
situation that was manipulated to be different from a character’s belief in relation to 
the same time point. Parallel to the false belief task, in the false sign task the authors 
presented verbal vignettes that also described a present situation that was 
manipulated to be different from the real situation in relation to the same time point. 
Unfortunately, Perner and colleagues (Aichhorn et al., 2008; Perner et al., 2006) only 
reported false belief over false sign results based on an fROI analysis. Functional 
ROI results suggest a specific role of the TPJ for ToM with respect to criterion three. 
As mentioned before, however, fROI results lack a strong empirical basis and have to 
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be confirmed by a whole brain analysis. Therefore, it is still unclear, on a whole 
brain level, whether the DMPFC and the TPJ show significantly stronger responses 
to representations about mental states (false beliefs) than to representations about 
physical states (e.g., false signs). Fortunately, Perner et al. (2006) report results, 
based on a whole brain analysis, that tackle criterion 4: the ToM network should not 
differentiate between non-mental stories regardless of whether they require 
representational abilities or not. For false sign stories over physical control stories 
that did not require a representational understanding, the DMPFC was not involved. 
Within the TPJ, the authors found a hemispheric dissociation. While the right TPJ 
(RTPJ) as well as the DMPFC was not associated with a representational 
understanding of physical states, the left TPJ (LTPJ) was. These results exclude a 
role for the DMPFC and the RTPJ for a representational understanding of physical 
states.  
In a recent fMRI study, our group explored the ToM network with respect to true 
and false belief reasoning on a whole brain analysis (Sommer et al., 2007). In parallel 
tasks, picture stories were presented that required subjects to engage in either true or 
false belief reasoning. The picture stories were modified from the original “Sally-
Anne-Scenario” that was developed to test false belief understanding (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985). The dorsal part of the anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) that can be seen 
as the posterior region of the medial frontal cortex (prMFC) and the RTPJ showed an 
activity increase for the false belief over true belief contrast. Βy contrast, both brain 
regions did not responded significantly to the conjunction of true and false beliefs. 
With respect to the ToM network, these results could help clarify criterion 1 (the 
ToM network should respond to belief reasoning in general, both true and false 
beliefs) and criterion 2 (the ToM network should show significantly stronger 
responses to mental states that require representation about mental states (e.g., false 
beliefs) compared to mental states that do not require representation about mental 
states (e.g., true beliefs)). With respect to criterion 1, the conjunction results show 
that neither within the DMPFC nor within the TPJ is there one single brain region 
that responds both to false beliefs and true beliefs. In regard to criterion 2, both the 
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DMPFC and the RTPJ are associated with representations about mental states 
compared to mental states that do not require representation about mental states. 
With respect to the criteria defining the ToM network, results support an 
important role for the DMPFC and the RTPJ in false belief reasoning. Both brain 
regions respond significantly stronger to false than to true beliefs (criterion 2). 
Further, both brain regions do not differentiate between non-mental stories, 
regardless of whether they require representational abilities or not (criterion 4: false 
sign versus photo). Regarding the generality criteria, there is no single brain region 
within the DMPFC and the TPJ that processes both true and false beliefs (criterion 
1). Criterion 1, however, needs to be further explored by contrasting both true and 
false belief reasoning with a non-mental control condition. In addition, whether the 
DMPFC and the RTPJ have a specific role in computing false beliefs over false signs 
remains to be explored by a whole brain analysis (criterion 3).  
The criteria defining the ToM network are based on domain-specific 
considerations. Domain-general Theory of Mind accounts, however, challenge the 
specificity criterion of the ToM network. Developmental and functional findings on 
domain-general processes show that false belief reasoning is closely related to low-
level processes such as attention or inhibition, and with more high-level processes 
such as language or episodic memory (for a review on developmental evidence see 
Sodian & Thoermer, 2006; for reviews on functional evidence see Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007; Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; 
Lieberman, 2007; Mitchell, 2006; Perner & Aichhorn, 2008; Stone & Gerrans, 
2006).  
In sum, domain-specific ToM accounts reveal an important role of the DMPFC 
and the RTPJ in false belief reasoning. Domain-general accounts, however, suggest 
that although the DMPFC and the RTPJ are important brain regions underlying false 
belief understanding, these regions may not be exclusively related to Theory of 
Mind. Instead, domain-general ToM accounts suggest that the DMPFC and the RTPJ 
are associated with more basic information processes. Nevertheless, the DMPFC and 
the RTPJ have turned out to be important candidate regions subserving false belief 
understanding.  
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1.2.2 Intention attribution 
Although there is no neuroimaging study on intention-based emotion attribution, 
several neuroimaging studies have been conducted on inferring intentions from 
physical stimuli such as nonverbal comic strips (Brunet et al., 2000; Walter et al., 
2004) or animated geometrical shapes (Castelli et al., 2002; Gobbini et al., 2007; 
Martin & Weisberg, 2003; Schultz, 2005; Tavares et al., 2008). The material was 
adopted from developmental research on intention attribution in normally developing 
children (Montgomery & Montgomery, 1999) and autistic children (Abell, Happe, & 
Frith, 2000; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986)  
Regarding the DMPFC and the RTPJ as candidate regions within the ToM 
network, the majority of studies found that inferring intentions from physical cues 
recruits the DMPFC (nonverbal comic strips: Brunet et al., 2000; Walter et al., 2004; 
animated geometrical shapes: Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Gobbini et al., 
2007; Schultz et al., 2003; Tavares et al., 2008; Vanderwal, Hunyadi, Grupe, 
Connors, & Schultz, 2008). The majority of studies, however, did not observe RTPJ 
recruitment. Rather than the RTPJ, these studies found that inferring intentions from 
physical cues was associated with large activation patterns in temporal regions, 
including the superior, middle, and inferior temporal cortex, the fusiform gyrus, and 
the temporal poles. These results suggest that intention attribution compared to false 
belief reasoning is associated with common activity in the DMPFC. In contrast, 
RTPJ activity seems to be associated with false belief reasoning rather than with 
intention attribution. 
Three studies, however, found RTPJ activity associated with intention attribution 
(nonverbal comic strips: Walter et al., 2004; animated geometrical shapes: Martin & 
Weisberg, 2003; Schultz et al., 2003). This RTPJ activity, however, could be due to 
methodological shortcomings. The studies used block designs, which also included 
response trials such as logical reasoning. Therefore, the RTPJ activity could also be 
an effect of other cognitive processes rather than an effect of intention attribution. In 
addition, Walter et al. (2004) contrasted an intention attribution condition involving 
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characters with a physical control condition without characters. Therefore, RTPJ 
activity could also be caused by the involvement of characters rather than by 
intention attribution.  
These considerations on methodological limitations, probably being due to RTPJ 
activity, are supported by two studies on intention attribution which either used a 
physical control condition involving characters (Brunet et al., 2000) or used an 
event-related approach (Tavares et al., 2008). In a PET study, Brunet et al. (2000) 
presented nonverbal comic strips adopted from a developmental study on intention 
attribution in autistic children (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986). In the intention attribution 
condition, an acting character was depicted. The target picture was presented along 
with two distracter pictures, which did not match the character’s intention. In 
addition to the intention condition, the authors presented two control conditions, 
which depicted physical causality. To control for the involvement of characters, one 
physical causality condition involved a character. The second physical causality 
condition involved no character. Attribution of intention compared to physical 
causality involving a character was associated with activity in the DMPFC, the 
lateral prefrontal cortex and the temporal poles. RTPJ activity was not observed in 
this contrast. Physical causality with characters compared to physical causalities 
without character activated the left TPJ, the temporal pole, the fusiform gyrus, and 
temporal brain regions. These results support the view that intention attribution is 
rather associated with prefrontal brain regions than with posterior brain regions, 
including the TPJ. 
A recent fMRI study on intention attribution used parallel material in an event-
related approach (Tavares et al., 2008). The authors presented animations of two 
geometrical shapes and included obstacles to motion. In order to broadly sample 
different interpersonal situations, they presented three categories of animations 
(friendly, antagonistic, indifferent). Following the animation probe, statements were 
presented which described the contents of the animation. The animation epoch and 
the response epoch were separately analysed. In the intention attribution condition 
participants were instructed to attend to the social behaviour that could underlie the 
motion of the geometrical shapes. In the control condition participants had to attend 
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to spatial, non-mental, properties with respect to the moving characters. In the 
response epoch of the intention attribution condition, participants had to judge, on a 
true/false dimension, if the statement could appropriately describe the behaviour in 
the animation. In the response epoch of the control condition participants had to 
decide on statements regarding these physical properties. Whole brain analysis 
results showed that in the animation epoch the DMPFC was the only brain region 
which responded significantly to attention on intention attribution compared to 
attention on physical properties. In the response epoch, together with the 
parahippocampal cortex, the DMPFC also responded significantly to intention 
attribution compared to the physical control condition. These results also support the 
assumption that the DMPFC is involved in intention attribution. 
Another recent fMRI study compared belief reasoning and intention attribution in 
the same adult sample (Gobbini et al., 2007). In the belief task the authors used 
verbal stories adopted from Fletcher et al. (1995) and nonverbal cartoons adopted 
from Gallagher et al. (2000). In the intention condition they presented animations of 
geometrical shapes adopted from Castelli et al. (2000). Both the belief and the 
intention trials showed activity in the DMPFC. However, there was only partial 
overlap within the DMPFC and no overlap in the TPJ. While belief reasoning was 
associated with activity more in the rostral part of the medial frontal cortex, intention 
attribution showed activity in more posterior parts of the DMPFC. In addition, while 
the TPJ was recruited for belief reasoning, intention attribution showed activity in the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) along with activity in the mirror neuron 
system (MNS, Iacoboni, 2008; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). The pSTS and the MNS 
are supposed to be involved in the action perception, with the MNS having a special 
role in understanding intentional motor activity. Based on their findings, the authors 
suggest that two nearby regions, the TPJ and the pSTS, play dissociable roles in the 
understanding of different mental states such as beliefs or intentions. They suggest 
that whereas the TPJ may play a role in the processing of mental states, which cannot 
be inferred by physical properties, the pSTS may play a role in the representation of 
perceived actions, and along with the mirror neuron system, the representation of 
intentions that are inferred from those physical actions. 
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In sum, neuroimaging findings on intention attribution from physical cues such as 
nonverbal comic strips and animated geometrical shapes suggest that both false 
belief reasoning and intention attribution are associated with only partially 
overlapping brain regions in the DMPFC. While false belief reasoning seems to be 
associated more with rostral parts of the medial prefrontal cortex, intention 
attribution seems to rely on activity in more posterior parts of the DMPFC (Fig. 1.1). 
In contrast to the DMPFC activity being involved in both false belief and intention 
understanding, the TPJ seems to be recruited during false belief reasoning rather than 
intention attribution. Intention attribution seems to rely more on activity in the pSTS 
and the MNS. These results suggest that the medial prefrontal cortex rather than the 
TPJ plays an important role not only in false belief reasoning but also in intention 
attribution. Moreover, these results may show that false belief reasoning and 
intention attribution are associated with both overlapping and distinct networks. 
Functional results therefore suggest that false belief understanding and intention 
attribution from physical cues rely on both common and distinct information 
processes. 
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Fig. 1.1: Involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex in ToM. More rostral parts of 
the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) are associated with false belief reasoning (red), 
more posterior parts of the MPFC are associated with the understanding of intentions 
inferred from physical cues (yellow).  
 
1.2.3 Emotion attribution 
In addition to studies that have explored the neural network associated with intention 
attribution inferred from physical cues, there are several studies that have explored 
emotion attribution inferred from physical cues such as affective eye gazes (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999; Wicker et al., 2003), affective faces (Schulte-Ruther et al., 2007) 
and pictures (Ochsner et al., 2004), affective point-light walkers (Heberlein & Saxe, 
2005), and affective verbal vignettes (Hynes et al., 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2004). 
Among those studies there are, however, only two studies that compared, on the level 
of a whole brain analysis, emotion attribution with a non-mental control condition in 
healthy adults (Ochsner et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003). The other studies cited 
above either reported results based on a region-of-interest analysis rather than on a 
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whole brain analysis (Hynes et al., 2006), or reported results for emotion attribution 
alone without directly comparing emotion attribution with the non-mental control 
condition (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), or compared self versus other judgements in 
emotion attribution without reporting results for attributing emotions to others 
compared to a non-mental control condition (Ruby & Decety, 2004; Schulte-Ruther 
et al., 2007), or compared emotion attribution with judgements about personality 
traits (Heberlein & Saxe, 2005). The personality traits condition contained social-
moral emotions such as trustworthiness and friendliness. Therefore, there is only 
little functional evidence with respect to the neural correlates associated with 
emotion attribution within the Theory of Mind research field (Olsson & Ochsner, 
2008). 
In a PET study, Wicker et al. (2003) compared emotions inferred from affective 
eye gaze with attentional judgements inferred from neutral eye gaze. Emotion 
attribution was associated with activity in the dorsal and ventral part of the medial 
prefrontal cortex, the bilateral temporal cortex, including the temporal poles, and the 
posterior cingulate / precuneus. These results, however, have to be interpreted with 
caution because emotion attribution confounds with the emotional material, since in 
the control condition neutral rather than emotional faces were presented. An fMRI 
study conducted by Ochsner et al. (2004) was controlled for these confounding 
effects. They compared emotion attribution inferred from positive, negative and 
neutral pictures with nonmental judgements inferred from the same set of stimuli. 
Emotion attribution was found to be associated with activity in the DMPFC, the 
bilateral middle temporal cortex, the precuneus, the middle occipital cortex, and the 
parahippocampal gyrus.  
In sum, with respect to the neural network associated with false belief reasoning, 
emotion attribution inferred from physical cues is particularly associated with 
activity in the DMPFC. Instead of TPJ activity, emotion attribution seems to be more 
associated with activity in the temporal cortex. As with intention attribution and false 
belief understanding, the medial prefrontal cortex rather than the TPJ may play an 
important role in emotion attribution inferred from physical cues. As with intention 
attribution, emotions inferred from physical cues seem to be associated more with 
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activity in temporal brain regions. These results suggest that false belief 
understanding, intention attribution, and inferring emotions from physical cues are 
associated with both overlapping and distinct networks. While intention and emotion 
attribution seem to rely on similar networks, there seems to be only an overlap with 
false belief understanding in the DMPFC. These results suggest that the DMPFC 
plays an important role in mental state attribution in general. Moreover, these results 
may show that while intention and emotion attribution are associated with similar 
information processes, false belief understanding may require, at least in part, 
distinct information processes. 
 
1.3 Summary and research question 
Although there are several neuroimaging studies on intention and emotion attribution 
inferred from physical cues, this is the first study which explores the neural network 
associated with emotion attribution based on other mental states such as intentions. 
Therefore, it is still an open question whether intention-based emotion attribution and 
belief reasoning are associated with common or distinct neural networks. Experiment 
one of this thesis investigates emotion attribution based on intention-outcome-
relations. 
Developmental findings suggest distinct neural networks because the ability for 
emotion attribution based on intention-outcome-relations shortly precedes the ability 
for false belief understanding. Specifically, with respect to mental state 
understanding, there seems to be a change from taking an objective stance in 2½- to 
4-year-olds to a subjective stance in 4- to 5-year-olds. Functional findings on false 
belief reasoning revealed an important role for the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex 
(DMPFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), particularly the right TPJ (RTPJ). 
Neuroimaging studies on intention and emotion attribution inferred from physical 
cues observed both distinct and common neural networks in relation to false belief 
understanding. Distinct activity was found in more posterior brain regions. The TPJ 
was observed to be more associated with false belief understanding, while temporal 
brain regions were found to be more associated with intention and emotion 
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attribution. Common activity was found in frontal brain regions, particularly the 
DMPFC. Based on the developmental and functional findings, it is hypothesized that 
intention-based emotion attribution would be associated with both distinct and 
common neural networks with respect to false belief understanding. It is predicted 
that the medial prefrontal cortex, particularly the DMPFC would be associated with 
intention-based emotion. Furthermore, it is predicted that more posterior brain 
regions, particularly the TPJ, would be less associated with intention-based emotion 
attribution.  
To explore emotion attribution based on intention-outcome-relations, nonverbal 
stories with verbal vignettes were presented. The material was adopted from 
developmental studies on intention-based emotion attribution. In the emotion 
attribution conditions, a protagonist’s intention either matched (intention fulfilled) or 
mismatched the outcome of the intended action (intention unfulfilled). In addition to 
the emotion attribution condition, a paralleled non-mental control condition was 
used. 
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2. METHODS 
STUDY I  
EMOTIONS INFERRED FROM INTENTION-OUTCOME-RELATIONS 
 
 
2.1 Participants 
Fourteen right-handed male subjects (age range = 22-45 years, M = 31.64 years, SD 
= 6.80 years) with no neurological or psychiatric history participated in the study. All 
participants gave informed consent according to the guidelines of the local Ethic 
Committee. 
 
2.2 Task and material 
Intention-based emotion attribution was explored by a modified, fMRI compatible 
version adopted from the developmental study of Yuill et al. (1996). Cartoons that 
were described by verbal vignettes were presented. The nonverbal pictures depicted 
three children playing, a protagonist and two recipients (Figs. 2.1 and 2.2). Eight 
story contexts were used: children playing with a ball, a teddy, a balloon, a toy 
airplane, a toy duck, a toy car, badminton, or hockey. The nonverbal material was 
held equivalent across the study conditions, which only differed in their verbal 
vignettes. Two emotion attribution conditions were realized which varied on the 
factor ‘intention-outcome-relation’ (Fig. 2.1). The factor ‘intention-outcome-relation’ 
varied on whether the protagonist’s intention matched (fulfilled intention) or 
mismatched the outcome situation (unfulfilled intention). Moreover, a non-mental 
control condition was realized that solely described physical processes (Fig. 2.2). 
In both emotion attribution conditions the verbal vignette in the first story picture 
described the protagonist’s intention (e.g., ‘Max wants to throw the ball to Lena’; 
‘Anna wants to roll the duck to Tim’). Emotion attribution conditions differed in the 
second story picture which presented the outcome of the intended action (fulfilled 
 33
  Study I – Methods 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
intention: e.g., ‘Max throws the ball to Lena; unfulfilled intention: e.g., ‘Anna rolls 
the duck to Marie’). In the third picture the protagonist was depicted and the 
participants were instructed to reason about the protagonist’s emotion dependent on 
its prior intention and on the outcome of the intended action (‘How does…feel?’). To 
separate reasoning about the actor’s emotion from giving a motor response, 
participants were instructed not to respond before the response stimulus was 
presented. The response stimulus depicted three smileys (neutral, positive, negative). 
Responses were given by pressing a button.  
In the reality condition verbal vignettes in the first two pictures described the 
scene (e.g., picture 1: ‘The kids are playing with the puck’; picture 2: ‘Max has the 
puck’). In the third picture participants were instructed to reason about the toy the 
kids were playing with (‘What is…playing with?’). In the fourth picture stimulus the 
target toy was presented along with two distracter toys. Here, participants were 
instructed to respond to the target toy by pressing a button. 
For each condition 34 trials were presented. In order to reduce response 
predictability in the emotion attribution conditions, 15 % control trials were 
presented along with the experimental trials. In these control trials participants had to 
reason about the emotional state of one of the recipients instead of reasoning about 
the protagonist’s emotional state. These trials were not included in the analysis. 
Stimulus complexity was held equivalent across conditions. The protagonist’s and 
the recipients’ gender was counterbalanced, as well as the protagonist’s presentation 
side on the screen (left/right). All children were presented without a facial expression 
in order not to trigger specific emotion attribution processes by the visual input. In 
the response trials the presentation order of the smileys and of the toys was 
counterbalanced.  
In order to obtain more specific emotion attribution responses, a rating task was 
conducted following the scanning session (Appendix B). In the rating task the same 
cartoon-stories were presented as in the experimental task and the same emotion 
attribution conditions were used. Five trials were presented in each emotion 
attribution condition. Participants were instructed to rate the actor’s emotion on six 
emotion dimensions (neutral, happiness, sadness, embarrassment, surprise, anger). 
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Each dimension varied on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(very strong). One rating data set was excluded from the analysis because of too 
many missing data. Therefore, thirteen data sets were included in the analysis of the 
rating data. 
 
2.3 Experimental procedure 
Prior to the experimental task participants attended a training session to become 
familiar with the stimulus material. Following the fMRI session, the rating task was 
conducted. During the fMRI session stimuli were back-projected onto a screen. Foam 
padding restricted head motion. Conditions were randomly presented across the 
scanning session. Within each trial stimuli were presented in a fixed order: the story 
stimuli (pictures 1 and 2) were presented for 2.5 seconds each. The emotion 
attribution stimulus and the reality processing stimulus (picture 3) were presented for 
6 seconds each. The response stimulus (picture 4) was presented for 2 seconds. Time 
varying fixation periods were presented before each trial (2-4 sec) and before the 
third picture (1-3 sec). Fixation periods were included to measure an inter-stimulus 
baseline and to properly model the hemodynamic response function associated with 
emotion attribution. Presentation software was used for stimulus presentation and for 
response recording (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA). Responses were 
recorded by using three buttons of a five-button fMRI compatible response pad 
(LUMItouch, Photon Control Inc., Burnaby, Canada).  
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Fixation (2-4 sec) 
Fixation (1-3 sec) 
Intention  
(Picture 1; 2.5 sec) 
Outcome  
(Picture 2; 2.5 sec) 
+ + 
+ + 
Response  
(Picture 4; 2 sec) 
Emotion-
Attribution 
(Picture 3; 6 sec) 
How does...feel? How does....feel? 
Anna rolls the duck to Marie Max throws the ball to Lena 
Emotions inferred from an 
unfulfilled intention 
Emotions inferred from a 
fulfilled intention 
Anna wants to roll the duck to Tim Max wants to throw the ball to Lena 
Fig. 2.1: Example of emotion attribution based on a fulfilled intention (left) and an 
unfulfilled intention (right). Pictures were consecutively presented with intermediate 
fixation periods varying in time intervals. Functional analysis focused on the emotion 
attribution stimuli (picture 3). 
 
 
 36
  Study I – Methods 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Fixation (1-3 sec) 
Reality  
(Picture 1; 2.5 sec) 
Fixation (2-4 sec) 
What is... playing with? 
Reality 
(Picture 2; 2.5 sec) Max has the puck 
The kids are playing with the puck 
+ 
+ 
Reality 
Processing 
(Picture 3; 6 sec) 
Response  
(Picture 4; 2 sec) 
Reality Judgement 
Fig. 2.2: Example of a reality judgement trial. Pictures were consecutively presented 
with intermediate fixation periods varying in time intervals. Functional analysis 
focused on the reality processing stimuli (picture 3). 
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2.4 Statistical analysis of the behavioural data 
The statistical analysis of the behavioural data was conducted with SPSS 15. In the 
reality condition response accuracy (in percentage) was analysed. With respect to the 
emotion attribution responses obtained during the scanning session, for every 
emotion dimension (neutral, positive, negative) the mean percentage of emotion 
responses out of its total amount was calculated. In the rating task for every emotion 
dimension (neutral, happiness, sadness, embarrassment, surprise, anger) a mean 
rating score ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong) was computed. For every 
emotion dimension statistical comparisons were done for the two experimental 
conditions (match: intention fulfilled; mismatch: intention unfulfilled) by conducting 
paired t-tests with Greenhouse-Geisser alpha-correction. T-tests were two-tailed and 
a value of p ≤. 05 was used to determine statistical significance. 
 
2.5 Imaging and image preprocessing 
Scanning was performed in an interleaved fashion on a 1.5 Tesla fMRI scanner 
(Siemens Sonata, Erlangen, Germany). The functional images sensitive to blood 
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrasts were acquired by T2*-weighted echo 
planar images (EPI, TR = 2.82 sec, TE = 40 ms, flip angle = 90°, in plane matrix 64 
x 64, FoV = 192 mm). The images consisted of 32 axial slices with 3 mm thickness 
and 3 x 3 mm in plane resolution. During the scanning 720 volumes were acquired. 
High resolution structural weighted images (TR = 1.97 sec, TE = 3.93 ms, TI = 1100 
ms, voxel size 1 x 1 x 1 mm, 176 axial slices, FoV = 250 mm) were recorded from 
all participants. The scanning session lasted approximately 40 min. 
All images were preprocessed using the SPM5 software package 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) and the MATLAB 7.0 software (The MathWorks 
Inc., Natick, MA). For each participant functional images were slice-time corrected 
using the middle slice as reference, realigned to the first volume by rigid body 
transformation to correct for participants’ motion, normalised to the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain (Collins, Neelin, Peters, & Evans, 
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1994), and spatially smoothed by a Gaussian kernel with a full-width half-maximum 
of 8mm. 
 
2.6 Statistical analysis of the images 
All statistical first and second-level analysis were conducted with the SPM5 software 
package and were based on the entire brain. The analysis focused on amplitude 
changes in the hemodynamic response function (HRF) associated with emotion 
attribution and reality judgement (picture 3). Fixation periods served to measure an 
inter-stimulus baseline and to analyse the hemodynamic response function associated 
with emotion attribution and reality judgement. 
In the first-level analysis a fixed effects analysis was computed for each 
participant based on the general linear model (GLM). The stimuli were modelled by 
boxcars of 5 seconds, which were then convolved with the HRF, along with its time 
and dispersion derivatives to account for any temporal and spatial shifts in the 
response of the stimuli (Friston et al., 1998). Also included were six covariates to 
capture residual movement-related artefacts and a single covariate representing the 
mean (constant) over scans. The data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cutoff 
at 128 seconds. Statistical parametric maps (SPMs) were generated for each subject 
by t-statistics derived from contrasts utilizing the HRF  (Friston et al., 2002). The 
derivates from the statistical model were not included in the contrasts.  
These contrasts of interest were computed on the individual analysis level: 
Contrast 1: emotion attribution versus reality judgement (‘Fulfilled Intention’ + 
‘Unfulfilled Intention’ versus ‘Non-Ment’) 
Contrast 2: Emotions inferred from unfulfilled intentions versus reality 
judgement (‘Unfulfilled Intention’ versus ‘Non-Ment’) 
Contrast 3: Emotions inferred from fulfilled intentions versus reality 
judgement (‘Fulfilled Intention’ versus ‘Non-Ment’) 
Contrast 4: Emotions inferred from unfulfilled versus fulfilled intentions 
(‘Unfulfilled Intention’ versus ‘Fulfilled Intention’) 
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These single-subject first-level contrast images from the weighted beta-images were 
introduced into second-level random-effects analysis to allow for population 
inference. For each contrast one-sample t-tests were conducted. All fMRI results 
reported here are based on voxel statistics computed with SPM for the entire brain. 
The resulting set of significant voxel values for each contrast constituted an SPM 
map. The maps were thresholded at T = 3.79 (p ≤. 001 uncorrected), overlaid on the 
MNI template, and labelled by using the MNI coordinates. For graphical purposes in 
those brain regions showing significant effects mean cluster values (parameter 
estimates) were extracted by using the SPM5 software.  
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3. RESULTS 
STUDY I  
EMOTIONS INFERRED FROM INTENTION-OUTCOME-RELATIONS 
 
 
3.1 Behavioural findings 
The emotion attribution results obtained during the fMRI session are shown in Table 
3.1 and Figure 3.1. Mean hitrate for the reality judgement was 98 % (SD = 4 %). 
Regarding emotion attribution results, significantly more positive emotions were 
attributed based on a fulfilled relative to an unfulfilled intention (t(13) = 8.14,  p ≤. 
001). In contrast, more neutral and negative emotions were attributed based on an 
unfulfilled compared to a fulfilled intention (t(13) = 3.38, p ≤. 01).  
 
 
Table 3.1: Mean emotion attribution scores of the fMRI session for the intention fulfilled and 
intention unfulfilled emotion attribution condition. 
Emotiona Fulfilled Intention Unfulfilled Intention 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
Neutral 9 (13) 27 (28) 
Positive 84 (19) 16 (20) 
Negative 7 (8) 57 (33) 
Notes: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.  
 a  Percentage of neutral, positive, and negative responses out of the total amount of 
emotion responses 
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Fig. 3.1: Main effect of the factor intention-outcome-relation. Results were obtained 
during the fMRI session. Mean emotion attribution scores (+/-1 SE) in the intention 
fulfilled (light grey) compared to the intention unfulfilled emotion attribution 
condition (dark grey).  
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More specific emotion attribution results were obtained during the rating task that 
followed the fMRI session (Tab. 3.2, Fig. 3.2). The rating results confirmed the 
emotion attribution results obtained in the fMRI session. On a rating scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong), significantly more happiness was attributed 
based on a fulfilled compared to an unfulfilled intention (t(12) = 8.56, p ≤. 001). In 
contrast, significantly more sadness (t(12) = 5.70, p ≤. 001), surprise (t(12) = 3.84, 
P≤.01), embarrassment (t(12) = 6.65, p ≤. 001), and anger (t(12) = 5.12, p ≤. 001) 
were attributed based on an unfulfilled compared to a fulfilled intention. For the 
neutral dimension no significant difference between emotion attribution conditions 
was observed (t(12) = 0.86, n.s.). 
 
 
Table 3.2: Mean emotion attribution scores of the rating task for the intention fulfilled and 
intention unfulfilled emotion attribution condition. 
Emotiona Fulfilled Intention Unfulfilled Intention 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
Neutral 1.80 (1.26) 1.51 (0.66) 
Happiness 4.38 (0.72) 2.00 (1.05) 
Surprise 1.41 (0.66) 2.78 (1.24) 
Embarrassment 1.45 (0.70) 3.48 (1.18) 
Sadness 1.06 (0.23) 2.78 (1.20) 
Anger 1.06 (0.23) 2.75 (1.16) 
Notes: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.  
 a  Rating scores range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong) 
 
 43
  Study I – Results 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*
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Fulfilled Intention 
Unfulfilled Intention 
Fig. 3.2: Main effect of the factor intention-outcome-relation. Results were obtained 
during the rating task. Mean emotion attribution scores (+/-1 SE; 1 = not at all; 5 = 
very strong) in the intention fulfilled (light grey) compared to the intention unfulfilled 
emotion attribution condition (dark grey).  
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3.2 Neuroimaging findings 
The fMRI analysis focused on the functional activity pattern associated with emotion 
attribution. FMRI results are listed in Table 3.3 and shown in Figures 3.3 to 3.6. In 
general, emotion attribution compared to reality judgement was associated with a 
signal increase in the medial pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA, BA6), and in 
the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, BA9). Further, emotions inferred 
from fulfilled and unfulfilled intentions compared to reality judgements were both 
associated with an activity increase in the medial pre-SMA (BA6, Fig. 3.3). 
Moreover, emotions inferred from unfulfilled intentions, but not fulfilled intentions, 
compared to reality judgements, were associated with a signal increase in the dorso- 
and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, BA9, Fig. 3.4; VLPFC, BA 47, Fig. 
3.5). Besides activity increases in response to emotion attribution, emotion 
attribution was associated with a linear signal decrease in the orbital part of the 
paracingulate cortex (BA 32, Fig. 3.6). Specifically, emotion attribution based on 
unfulfilled intentions showed a significantly stronger signal decrease compared to 
emotion attribution based on fulfilled intentions. Further, reality judgements were 
associated with a significant activity increase compared to both emotion attribution 
conditions. 
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Table 3.3: Brain regions showing significant functional signal changes associated with 
emotion attribution. 
Brain region BA Cluster 
Sizea 
t-value  
(df = 13)b 
x,y,z (mm)c 
Emotion Attribution  vs Reality     
Pre-supplementary motor area 6 360 7.11d -6, 6, 66 
Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 9 145 5.33d 46, 16, 34 
Fulfilled Intention vs Reality     
Pre-supplementary motor area 6 93 6.95e -8, 2, 64 
Unfulfilled Intention vs Reality     
Pre-supplementary motor area 6 215 6.35d   -8, 8, 64 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 104 5.80e  -32, 24, -8 
Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 9 140 5.45d 44, 12, 34 
Fulfilled Intention vs Unfulfilled Intention     
Orbital paracingulate cortex  32 173 7.22d 4, 40, -8 
Reality  vs Unfulfilled Intention     
Orbital paracingulate cortex 32 1146 7.83d  6, 44, 0 
Reality vs Fulfilled Intention     
Orbital paracingulate cortex 32 178 5.64d 8, 46, 4 
Notes: BA, Brodmann’s areas are approximate.  
 a Numbers of activated voxels per cluster.  
 b Peak t-value in activated cluster, df = degrees of freedom. 
 c Peak coordinate of activated cluster according to the Montreal Neurological  
 Institute (MNI) atlas.  
 d Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤. 05 (corrected). 
 e  Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤ .01 (corrected). 
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(A) 
Fig. 3.3: (A) Functional changes in the amplitude of the HRF in the medial pre-SMA 
(BA6) associated with emotion attribution. (B) BA6 showed a significant signal 
increase associated with emotion attribution based on both an unfulfilled (EmoAtt-
IntUnful) and fulfilled intention (EmoAtt-IntFul), compared to reality judgement (Non-
Ment). HRF, hemodynamic response function; BA, Brodmann’s area. 
(B) 
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(A) 
Fig. 3.4: (A) Functional changes in the amplitude of the HRF in the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (BA9) associated with emotion attribution. (B) BA9 showed a 
significant signal increase associated with emotion attribution based on an unfulfilled 
intention (EmoAtt-IntUnful) compared to reality judgement (Non-Ment). HRF, 
hemodynamic response function; BA, Brodmann’s area. 
(B) 
*
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(A) 
Fig. 3.5: (A) Functional changes in the amplitude of the HRF in the left ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (BA47) associated with emotion attribution. (B) BA47 showed a 
significant signal increase associated with emotion attribution based on a an unfulfilled 
intention (EmoAtt-IntUnful) compared to reality judgement (Non-Ment). HRF, 
hemodynamic response function; BA, Brodmann’s area. 
 
(B) 
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(A) 
(B) 
Fig. 3.6: (A) Functional changes in the amplitude of the HRF in the orbital part of the 
paracingulate cortex (BA32) associated with emotion attribution. (B) BA32 showed a 
significant signal decrease in the intention unfulfilled condition (EmoAtt-IntUnful) 
compared to the intention fulfilled condition (EmoAtt-IntFul) Further, reality 
judgements (Non-Ment) were associated with a significant activity increase compared 
to both emotion attribution conditions. HRF, hemodynamic response function; BA, 
Brodmann’s area. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
STUDY I  
EMOTIONS INFERRED FROM INTENTION-OUTCOME-RELATIONS 
 
 
This thesis extends research on the neural network involved in false belief reasoning, 
the key Theory of Mind ability, to intention-based emotion attribution. The ability to 
infer another person’s emotions from his or her intention is closely acquired around 
the ability to understand false beliefs, the key ToM ability. The first experiment 
explored the neural network involved in emotion attribution inferred from intention-
outcome-relations. In the emotion attribution conditions a protagonist’s intention 
either matched or mismatched the outcome of the intended action. In addition to the 
emotion attribution condition, a paralleled non-mental control condition was used. 
Chapter 4.1 discusses the behavioural findings, followed by the discussion of the 
functional findings (chapter 4.2) and a summary (chapter 4.3). 
 
4.1 Behavioural findings 
While emotion attribution based on a fulfilled intention was associated with more 
positive emotions, more negative emotions were inferred from unfulfilled intentions. 
These results were confirmed by a rating task that followed the fMRI session. 
Emotions inferred from fulfilled intentions were associated with happiness ratings; 
emotions inferred from unfulfilled intentions were associated with more negative 
emotions such as sadness, surprise, embarrassment, and anger. The results are 
supported by a developmental study which comprised an adult sample in addition to 
children samples (Lagattuta, 2005). The ability to appropriately relate intentions with 
outcome information is required before the development of false belief 
understanding. By the age of 2½ to 4 years children are able to judge a person 
holding a neutral intention as feeling happy when a desired goal was fulfilled and as 
feeling sad when the desired goal was not fulfilled (Astington; Feinfield et al., 1999; 
 51
  Study I – Discussion 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Lagattuta, 2005; Stein & Levine, 1989; Wellman & 
Banerjee, 1991; Wellman & Woolley, 1990; Yuill, 1984; Yuill et al., 1996). 
Therefore, in the present experiment it seems that adults’ ratings are based on goal-
oriented considerations (Lagattuta, 2005). The ability to infer emotions from 
intention-outcome relations shortly develops before the ability to understand false 
beliefs. It is still an open question whether emotion attribution based on intention-
outcome-relations is associated with common or distinct neural networks in relation 
to false belief reasoning. 
 
4.2 Neuroimaging findings 
Emotion attribution based on intention-outcome-relations was observed to be 
confined to activity in the prefrontal cortex. While the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC, BA 9) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC, BA 47) responded 
to emotions inferred from unfulfilled intentions compared to reality, the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) responded to emotion attribution based on fulfilled as well 
as unfulfilled intentions, compared to reality. Moreover, a dissociation within the 
MPFC was observed along a dorsal-ventral axis. While the medial pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA, BA 6) showed activity increases for emotion 
attribution based on unfulfilled and fulfilled intentions, compared to reality, the 
orbital part of the paracingulate cortex (BA 32) was associated with an activity 
decrease for both intention conditions compared to the reality condition. What 
follows is the discussion of the activity increase in the pre-SMA (chapter 4.2.1), the 
dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (chapter 4.2.2 and 4.2.3) and the 
discussion of the activity decrease in the orbital part of the paracingulate cortex 
(chapter 4.2.4).  
 
4.2.1 Activity increase in the medial pre-SMA 
Intention-based emotion attribution was found to activate the medial pre-SMA. This 
finding is supported by neuroimaging studies on intention attribution inferred from 
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physical cues (Brunet et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007). Brunet et al. (2000) 
observed that the processing of intentions inferred from physical cues was associated 
with activity in the DMPFC, extending into premotor regions. Further support comes 
from Gobbini et al. (2007), who compared belief reasoning and intention attribution 
in the same adult sample. While belief reasoning was associated with activity more 
in the rostral part of the medial prefrontal cortex, intention attribution showed 
activity in more posterior parts of the DMPFC, extending into premotor regions. 
Therefore, the present findings suggest that emotions may be inferred by the 
processing of intentions in relation to physical cues, such as the outcome situation, 
rather than by processing the actor’s intention independent of physical cues. In 
developmental terms, participants may have inferred the actor’s emotion by 
processing the ‘intended situation’ (objective stance) rather than the ‘actor’s 
intention’ (subjective stance). The neuroimaging findings therefore can help clarify 
developmental theories by providing functional evidence that even in adulthood 
emotions may be inferred from intention-outcome relations, and, at least in the case 
of neutral intentions, based on an objective stance. 
Further support for the interpretation that the activity increase in the pre-SMA 
may indicate that participants may have inferred the actor’s emotion by matching its 
intention to the outcome situation comes from research on mirror neurons (for 
reviews on the mirror neuron system see Gallese, 2007; Iacoboni & Mazziotta, 2007; 
Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008). Mirror neurons are supposed to be located in 
monkey and human brain regions which have a predominately or fundamentally 
motor function. In humans these brain regions are assumed to be the rostral part of 
the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the ventral and dorsal premotor cortex, and the 
posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), including BA 44 and BA45. Mirror 
neurons do not only become active when performing a motor act, but they also 
activate during the observation of goal-centred aspects of another’s motor act. 
Researchers on the mirror neuron system define goal-directed behaviour in terms of 
intentionality. Therefore, they suppose that mirror neurons process the intentionality 
aspects of the motor behaviour. More specifically, mirror neurons are supposed to 
map the sensory representation induced by action observation onto the motor 
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representation of that same action. Researchers who support the role of mirror 
neurons in intention understanding emphasize that, without mapping sensory 
representations onto motor representations, these sensory aspects of a motor 
behaviour could not be processed in terms of their intentional meaning. At best, they 
argue, the sensory cues would provide a description of the various sensory aspects of 
the observed action (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2007). With respect to Theory of Mind, 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia (2007) argue that the mirror neurons indicate that intentions 
do not necessarily have to be represented independent of reality. That is, they are not 
necessarily processed independent of physical cues (see also Gallese, Cossu, & 
Sinigaglia, 2009). Based on the assumption that mirror neurons process the 
intentionality aspects of observed actions, they argue that intentions can also be 
processed in relation to physical cues such as motor behaviour. 
Iacoboni et al. (2005) explored in an fMRI study whether the human mirror 
neuron system is involved in understanding the intentional aspects of a motor act. 
Participants were presented video clips in which they observed the same grasping 
action (intention condition: e.g., grasping a tea pot), which was embedded in 
different contexts (drinking vs cleaning). The authors reasoned that the same action 
done in two different contexts would represent different meanings and therefore 
should reflect different intentions. This intention condition was contrasted with two 
control conditions. In one control condition video clips were presented that depicted 
the different contexts without grasping actions. In the second control condition, 
participants had to observe context-free grasping actions. In addition to varying the 
intentional action, the authors manipulated the instruction. In the implicit instruction 
condition participants were simply required to watch the video clips. In the explicit 
instruction condition subjects had to attend to the objects displayed in the context 
condition, to the type of grip in the action condition, and they had to figure out the 
intention motivating the grasping action in the intention condition. Besides other 
brain regions within the human mirror neuron system, the lateral part of pre-SMA 
showed a signal increase for the intention condition compared to the context 
condition. In the present study, however, a signal increase was found for the medial 
pre-SMA for intention-based emotion attribution. This dissociation is likely due to 
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differences in the stimulus material. In the present study the critical story information 
was contained in the verbal vignettes, while in the study of Iacoboni et al. (2005), the 
critical information was spatial (hand-grasping actions). A recent study showed that 
the pre-SMA is modality-specific activated: Tanaka, Honda, & Sadato (2005) 
revealed that the medial pre-SMA has been found to be involved in the updating of 
verbal material while the lateral pre-SMA has been observed to be recruited during 
the updating of spatial material. In addition, Iacoboni et al. (2005) observed that the 
medial part of the pre-SMA responded significantly to the explicit decoding of 
intentional actions as opposed to their passive observation. With respect to pre-SMA 
activity the authors argue that the pre-SMA may be involved in the controlled 
processing of motor intentionality. 
The interpretation that the pre-SMA may play a role in the processing of 
intentional motor acts could be further discussed within Searle’s (1983) framework, 
which defines intention-in-action as being opposed to prior intentions. While he 
defines prior intentions as intentions that are formed independent of reality cues, he 
supposes that intention-in-actions cannot be processed independent of physical cues, 
because they are defined as being bound to certain intentional actions. Since the pre-
SMA seems to play a role in attributing intentions based on physical cues such as 
motor actions, the present results may show that during intention based emotion 
attribution the actor’s intention may rather have been processed as an intention-in-
action than as a prior intention. In other words, even adults may have processed the 
actor’s intention rather by matching it to the outcome situation than by processing it 
independent of reality cues.  
With respect to the role of the pre-SMA in explicitly processing motor intention, it 
was also found to be activated more during the observation of unintended compared 
to intended motor acts (Buccino et al., 2007). Although not significant, in the present 
study pre-SMA activity was also found to be more increased for emotion attribution 
based on unfulfilled (unintended) compared to fulfilled (intended) intentions (Fig. 
3.3). This relative pre-SMA signal increase for unfulfilled as opposed to fulfilled 
intention-based emotion attributions may indicate that, in order to attribute emotions 
based on unfulfilled intentions, participants had to perform the intention-outcome 
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matching strategy in a more controlled fashion than when they had to attribute 
emotions based on a fulfilled intention. This assumption is supported by a recent 
study which shows that the pre-SMA plays an important role in the inhibition of 
automatic motor responses (Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008). In particular, the 
authors found the pre-SMA to be involved in the suppression of a prepotent or 
competing response and switching to a controlled response modus. In the present 
study, in the case of unfulfilled intentions, participants may have suppressed an 
automatic intention-outcome-match response based on an intention-outcome-match 
situation (e.g., feeling good = the intended other commonly catches the ball in a 
simple ball). Instead, they may have switched the automatic emotion response to a 
controlled intention-outcome-match strategy based on an intention-outcome 
mismatch situation (e.g., feeling bad = the intended other uncommonly does not 
catch the ball in a ball-playing game). 
In sum, the activity increase in the medial pre-SMA for intention-based emotion 
attribution, particularly for unfulfilled intentions compared to reality judgements may 
index that even adult participants may have matched an ‘intended situation’ to an 
outcome situation rather than processing an actor’s intention independent of reality 
cues. Therefore, intention-based emotion attribution, at least for neutral intentions, 
does not seem to require representational processes. Moreover, inferring emotions 
from unfulfilled intention-outcome situations seems to require the inhibition of an 
automatic emotion response. Therefore, particularly mismatched intention-outcomes 
relations seem to be processed in a controlled information processing modus. 
 
4.2.2 Activity increase in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
Emotion attribution based on unfulfilled intentions, but not fulfilled intentions, was 
associated with an activity increase in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, BA 
9). In general, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays an important role in the cognitive 
control of behaviour (for recent reviews see Badre, 2008; Badre & Wagner, 2007; 
Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Petrides, 2005). Therefore, the DLPFC activity is 
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consistent with the assumption that the processing of a mismatch in intention-
outcome relations may be associated with controlled information processing. 
With respect to cognitive-control theories the PFC is assumed to exert its control 
by maintaining and biasing task-relevant information over competing task-irrelevant 
information and to exert this control hierarchically along a rostral-caudal axis  
(Badre, 2008; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007). The more rostral a brain region is 
located along this axis, the more abstract its control demands are supposed to be. For 
example, Badre & D'Esposito  (2007) tested whether the functional gradient along 
the caudal to rostral axis of the PFC is based on a representational hierarchy that is 
supposed to be ranked by the abstractness of the representation to be selected. These 
results could help further specify the role of the DLPFC in processing abstract 
representations. The authors defined a representation to be more abstract than 
another representation to the extent that it generalizes over specific categories. That 
is, a more abstract or superordinate representation was defined as comprising a 
category or class of categories of subordinate representations. Based on this 
hierarchical definition of abstractness, the authors presented tasks that started at the 
lowest level from the concrete motor response (first-order abstraction level). At this 
first-order abstraction task the relational operation was to map competing simple 
perceptual cues to a specific motor response (response task; cues: coloured squares). 
At the second-order abstraction task, the relational operation was to map competing 
cues that were more complex than the simple perceptual cues from the response task 
to a predefined motor response (feature task; cues: objects in coloured squares). At 
the third-order abstraction task the relational operation was to map competing 
relational properties between two objects to a predefined motor response (dimension 
task; cues: two objects in coloured squares). The context task at the fourth-order 
abstraction level was identical to the dimension task. The frequency, however, with 
which a colour-to-dimension mapping occurred, was varied. While at the first- and 
second-order abstraction task the cue-to-response mapping was more stimulus-
driven, at the third- and fourth-order abstraction tasks, the cue-to-response mapping 
was based on more stimulus-independent operations, such as relational properties 
between objects. The authors observed the hypothesised hierarchical PFC 
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organisation along a rostral-caudal axis: The dorsal premotor cortex was sensitive to 
the first-order abstraction level and the anterior dorsal premotor cortex was involved 
in processing tasks on a second-order abstraction level. Interestingly, the DLPFC was 
activated for the third-order abstraction task, and, finally, the frontal polar cortex was 
observed to be sensitive to the fourth-order abstraction task. Concerning the DLPFC 
and the frontal polar cortex, Badre & D'Esposito’s  (2007) findings first show that 
these brain regions are involved in more stimulus-independent operations. Second, 
these findings show that the frontal pole is to a greater degree involved in processing 
abstract representations than the DLPFC.  
Based on Badre & D'Esposito’s  (2007) findings on the involvement of the 
DLPFC in processing abstract, stimulus-independent operations, two interpretations 
can be derived with respect to the DLPFC activity increase for emotions inferred 
from unfulfilled intentions. First, the DLPFC activity may indicate that, in addition to 
more concrete, outcome oriented information processes, as indexed by the pre-SMA 
activity, emotion attribution based on unfulfilled intentions may require more 
abstract, stimulus-independent operations. Second, as argued above, the frontal pole, 
to a greater degree as the DLPFC, is supposed to be involved in computing abstract 
relational operations (for review see Ramnani & Owen, 2004). While inferring 
emotions from unfulfilled intentions was associated with DLPFC activity, false belief 
reasoning as opposed to true belief reasoning was found to be associated with frontal 
pole activity (Sommer et al., 2007). Therefore, relative to false belief reasoning, 
emotion attribution based on unfulfilled intentions may require less abstract 
stimulus-independent operations.  
More specifically with respect to the DLPFC involvement in abstract stimulus-
independent operations, the DLPFC plays an important role in processing abstract 
mental operations required during executive processing, particularly the 
manipulation of information in working memory (Owen, McMillan, Laird, & 
Bullmore, 2005; Wager & Smith, 2003). The DLPFC activity for emotion attribution 
based on unfulfilled intentions may therefore indicate that the stimulus-independent 
processes participants had performed may have been based on a higher need of 
manipulating information in working memory than during reality judgements. This 
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seems reasonable because during emotion attribution inferred from unfulfilled 
intentions, the intention as well as the outcome situation had to be held in memory 
and had to be computed with each other. In contrast, in the reality condition, no such 
information manipulation was necessary. Participants only had to retrieve the second 
picture (e.g., ‘Anna has the ball’) from working memory in order to answer the 
reality question (e.g., ‘What is Anna playing with?’). Since emotion attribution based 
on fulfilled intentions did not vary DLPFC activity, this result may indicated that the 
intended situation and the outcome situation had not been computed with one 
another. Instead, participants may have solely related the outcome situation to an 
emotion (e.g., feeling good = someone caught a ball in a ball-playing game). 
Regarding the DLPFC activity, there is functional overlap between emotion 
attribution based on unfulfilled intentions and false belief reasoning because false 
belief relative to true belief understanding was also observed to be associated with 
DLPFC activity (Sommer et al., 2007).  
In sum, the present results show that emotions inferred from intention-outcome 
relations, particularly mismatching intention-outcome relations, may be associated 
both with stimulus-dependent processes, as indexed by the pre-SMA activity, and 
with stimulus-independent processes, as indexed by the DLPFC activity. Whereas 
with respect to false belief reasoning, intention-based emotion attribution seems to be 
based on less demanding abstract operations than false belief reasoning. The 
manipulation of information in working memory is likely underlying these stimulus-
independent operations, as indexed by the DLPFC activity. Working memory 
operations, therefore, seem to be a common operation required both during emotion 
attribution based on unfulfilled intentions and false belief reasoning.  
Furthermore, an fMRI study by Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham (2004) 
showed that there seems to be a special coupling of the DLPFC and the pre-SMA 
during the controlled processing of intentional information. In this study participants 
had to perform the temporal judgment task developed by Libet, Gleason, Wright, & 
Pearl (1983). In the intention condition participants were required to pay attention to 
their intention before the movement. They were required to report the timing of their 
intention to move. In contrast, in the control condition subjects had to report when 
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they had actually pressed the button. While the pacing of the actions and the amount 
of time for preparation was similar across conditions, the two temporal judgments 
differed significantly. Based on these findings the authors reasoned that the 
participants were genuinely attending to different events. The pre-SMA, together 
with the DLPFC and the lateral superior parietal cortex, were the only brain regions 
that responded significantly to intention processing. In a connectivity analysis, the 
authors observed that the activity between the pre-SMA and the DLPFC increased 
significantly from the movement to the intention condition, but not with respect to 
the pre-SMA and the parietal activation. Based on these findings, the authors suggest 
that there is a special functional relationship between the pre-SMA and the DLPFC 
activity during the attention to intentions.  
 
4.2.3 Activity increase in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
Besides pre-SMA and DLPFC activity, emotion attribution based on unfulfilled 
intentions was associated with activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(VLPFC), particularly the anterior VLPFC (BA 47). The VLPFC plays an important 
role in the cognitive control of memory (Badre & Wagner, 2007). While the anterior 
VLPFC is supposed to be involved in the controlled access to stored conceptual 
representations, the mid-VLPFC (BA 45) is argued to support a domain-general 
selection process that operates post-retrieval to resolve competition among active 
representations. Therefore, the present findings suggest that during emotion 
attribution for unfulfilled intentions, scripts may have been retrieved in a controlled 
information processing modus (e.g., ‘people feel sad when their intentions mismatch 
the state of reality’). This interpretation is consistent with empirical evidence on 
VLPFC activity in association with the retrieval of emotional information, such as 
affective faces (Nakamura et al., 1999) or the coupling of affective faces and 
emotional situations (Sommer, Döhnel, Meinhardt, & Hajak, 2008). Moreover, the 
findings suggest that emotion attribution based on both an unfulfilled intention and 
on false belief understanding require script retrieval, because false belief relative to 
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true belief understanding was also observed to be associated with BA 47 activity 
(Sommer et al., 2007). 
 
4.2.4 Activity decrease in the orbital part of the paracingulate cortex 
Besides activity increases in the pre-SMA and the lateral prefrontal cortex, intention-
based emotion attribution, particularly for unfulfilled intentions, was associated with 
a linear activity decrease in the orbital part of the paracingulate cortex (BA 32), 
which is part of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Specifically, emotion attribution 
based on unfulfilled intentions showed the strongest decrease in functional activity 
followed by a lesser decrease in functional activity for emotions inferred from 
fulfilled intentions. In contrast, the reality condition was associated with an activity 
increase, compared to both the baseline level and to the intention conditions.  
The signal decrease observed for intention based emotion attribution may be 
explained within the framework of the ‘default mode network’. The ‘default mode 
network’ comprises brain regions within cortical midline structures, including the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; 
Gusnard, Raichle, & Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). Neuroimaging studies 
observed functional deactivations in ‘default mode network’ related brain regions 
when subjects were engaged in active task processing. Moreover, these task-induced 
deactivations were related to decreasing self-referential processes (McKiernan, 
D'Angelo, Kaufman, & Binder, 2006). For example, McKiernan et al. (2006) 
explored the relationship between task difficulty, task-unrelated thoughts and task-
induced deactivations. First, the authors observed that with increasing task difficulty 
in an exogenous task, task-unrelated thoughts decreased. Further, as task-induced 
deactivations increased, task-unrelated thought declined. Therefore, deactivations 
within the ‘default mode network’ are commonly interpreted as a disengagement of 
self-referential processes towards task-related processes (for reviews see Beer, 2007; 
Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004). That VMPFC activity decreases are likely associated 
with the suspension of task-unrelated, internally triggered, affective thoughts in 
favour of task-related, cognitive processes could be shown in a study by Gusnard, 
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Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle (2001). The authors explored the involvement of the 
medial prefrontal cortex in self-referential mental activity, cued by affective pictures. 
In the internally cued, self-referential condition, participants had to perform 
pleasantness judgements. In the externally cued, non self-referential condition, 
participants had to perform indoor-outdoor judgements on the affective material. The 
authors observed a dissociation in the medial PFC. While the DMPFC was associated 
with an activity increase for the control condition over the self-referential condition, 
both conditions were related with activity decreases in the VMPFC, particularly the 
self-referential condition that was based on affective self-referential judgements. 
These findings can be interpreted that internal, affective processes are suspended in 
the VMPFC in order to process external cues. Further support for the involvement of 
the VMPFC in emotional processing comes from empirical evidence showing an 
MPFC dissociation with respect to cognitive versus affective processing. While the 
DMPFC has been shown to be mainly involved in cognitive processing, the VMPFC 
has been found to play an important role in emotional processing (Ochsner, Hughes, 
Robertson, Cooper, & Gabrieli, 2008; Steele & Lawrie, 2004). Based on these 
findings it can be argued that intention-based emotion attribution, particularly for 
unfulfilled intentions, seems to be associated with the suspension of task-unrelated, 
internally triggered, affective thoughts in favour of task-related, cognitive processes, 
as indexed by the activity increases in brain regions associated with more cognitive 
processes such as the pre-SMA and the dorso- and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. 
Which internally triggered, affective processes may have to be suspended in 
favour of task performance? The orbital MPFC (oMPFC) is involved in the 
representation and updating of possible future outcomes, that is, the evaluation of 
personal outcome values (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Rushworth, Behrens, Rudebeck, & 
Walton, 2007). For example, Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover (2005) 
observed that oMPFC activity was associated with the anticipated gain probability, 
and Walton, Devlin, & Rushworth (2004) found that oMPFC activity varied with the 
need to monitor the outcomes of externally guided actions. To interpret the activity 
increase associated with reward processing in terms of the default network, reward 
processing could be argued to be a highly self-referential process, and hence should 
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result in signal increases within the ‘default mode network’. Based on this 
assumption, signal decreases would be expected in the oMPFC when processing 
others’ reward. The present study found oMPFC signal decreases associated with 
emotion attribution based on attributing emotions to others. Moreover, a linear 
relationship between task demands and task-induced deactivations was observed. To 
integrate the ‘default mode network’ account and the reward account, the observed 
oMPFC deactivation may indicate that when task demands increase, which seems to 
be mostly the case for emotion attribution based on unfulfilled intentions, as indexed 
by the strongest task-induced deactivation for these emotion judgements, affective 
processes concerning ones own reward in situations like that may be suspended in 
order to represent and update the reward value of other’s outcome situations. 
 
4.3 Summary 
The present study aimed to specify the information processes that may underlie 
emotion attribution based on intention-outcome-relations, an ability that shortly 
develops before the ability to understand false belief scenarios. It was hypothesized 
that inferring emotions from intention-outcome-relations would be associated with 
both distinct and common neural networks with respect to false belief understanding. 
Specifically, it was predicted that frontal brain regions, particularly the DMPFC, 
would be associated with intention-based emotion attribution. Furthermore, it was 
predicted that more posterior brain regions, particularly the TPJ, would be less 
associated with intention-based emotion attribution. Both predictions were 
confirmed. These results, on the one hand, confirm the hypothesis that the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is recruited as well for intention-based emotion attribution 
as for false belief understanding. On the other hand, however, the neuroimaging 
findings show that distinct subregions within the MPFC are associated with 
intention-based emotion attribution and false belief understanding. While false belief 
reasoning has been shown to be associated with activity in more rostral parts of the 
MPFC (Aichhorn et al., 2008; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Perner et 
al., 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe et al., 2006; Saxe & 
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Wexler, 2005; Sommer et al., 2007), the present results reveal that intention-based 
emotion attribution seems to be associated with activity in more posterior parts of the 
MPFC, specifically the medial pre-SMA. Moreover, emotion attribution based on 
intention-outcome-relations varies activity in the orbital part of the paracingulate 
cortex, which, in turn, is not commonly recruited during false belief understanding. 
These results suggest that, although the MPFC is recruited during both intention-
based emotion attribution and false belief understanding, the story seems to be more 
complex in that intention-based emotion attribution is probably associated with 
distinct information processes compared to false belief reasoning. Understanding 
false beliefs is supposed to require a representational understanding of mental states 
because false beliefs have to be evaluated independent of reality cues. Neuroimaging 
findings suggest a special role of the rostral MPFC and the TPJ in false belief 
understanding. Hence, these brain regions are supposed to be associated with the 
representational understanding of mental states. With respect to intention-based 
emotion attribution, neither the rostral MPFC nor the TPJ were found to be activated. 
Therefore, the results suggest that emotions can be inferred from intention-outcome 
relations without representing the actor’s intention independent of reality. 
Specifically, the pre-SMA activity observed during intention-based emotion 
attribution supports developmental theories which assume that even adults may infer 
emotions from intention-outcome relations by matching others’ intentions in relation 
to the outcome situation rather than processing the intention independent of reality 
cues. That is, adults take an objective stance rather than a subjective stance in 
intention-based emotion attribution. Besides stimulus-dependent processes, stimulus-
independent processes seem to particularly underlie emotion attribution based on 
unfulfilled intentions. These processes are likely to be the manipulation of 
information in working memory, as indexed by the DLPFC activity, and script 
retrieval, as indexed by the VLPFC activity. Both operations seem to be basic 
processes required both during emotion attribution based on unfulfilled intentions 
and on false belief reasoning. Moreover, emotion attribution based on unfulfilled 
intentions may be particularly associated with a suspension of self-referential, reward 
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related outcome evaluations in favour of representing and updating others’ possible 
future outcomes, as indexed by the oMPFC activity decrease.  
Based on the results of the first experiment, the second experiment explores the 
neural network associated with emotions inferred from the integration of immoral 
intentions into intention-outcome-relations, an ability which is acquired shortly after 
the development of false belief understanding. 
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5. INTRODUCTION 
STUDY II 
EMOTIONS INFERRED FROM THE INTEGRATION OF IMMORAL 
INTENTIONS INTO INTENTION-OUTCOME-RELATIONS 
 
 
While the first experiment was concerned with the neural correlates associated with 
emotion attribution based on intention-outcome-relations, the second experiment 
aims at investigating brain regions that process the integration of immoral intentions 
into the processing of intention-outcome-relations. Before the age of six children 
have difficulties to appropriately perform this integration process. That is, so called 
happy victimizer attributions are observed in children beyond six years (chapter 5.1). 
The developmental chapter is followed by neuroimaging findings on the processing 
of transgression scenarios (chapter 5.2). The introduction concludes with a summary 
of the introduction part and with deducing the research question (chapter 5.3). 
 
5.1 The happy victimizer phenomenon 
The happy victimizer phenomenon is defined as a developmental shift around the age 
of 6 to 7 in young children’s judgments of a victimizer’s emotions in response to a 
transgression or willpower scenario. Though children before age 6 to 7 are able to 
understand moral values, compared to older children and adults they judge 
victimizers to feel more positive and less negative emotions after successful 
transgression, and ‘moral heros’ to feel less positive and more negative emotions 
after the potential transgressor has restrained from the transgression (Arsenio, Gold, 
& Adams, 2006; Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Barden, Zelko, 
Duncan, & Masters, 1980; Keller, Gummerum, Wang, & Lindsey, 2004; Keller, 
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Lourenco, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003; Lagattuta, 2005; Lourenco, 1997; Nunner-
Winkler & Sodian, 1988; Sokol, 2004; Sokol & Chandler, 2004; Yuill et al., 1996). 
 Nunner-Winkler & Sodian (1988) were the first who systematically explored the 
happy victimizer phenomenon (for earlier findings see Barden et al., 1980). In their 
first experiment out of a series of three experiments, Nunner-Winkler & Sodian 
(1988) presented 4- to 8-year-olds stories of a child transgressing (immoral version) 
and a child sustaining from transgression (moral version). All age groups understood 
the moral rule that it is not right to transgress. Interestingly, in the immoral version 
younger children compared to older children judged a victimizer to feel less negative 
and more positive emotions (positive emotion attributions: 74% in 4-year-olds, 40% 
in 6-year-olds; negative emotion attributions: 90% in 8-year-olds). Further, in the 
moral version, where the protagonist resisted to transgress, the authors observed 
more ‘sad moral hero’ responses in 6-year-olds compared to 8-year-olds (for similar 
‘sad moral hero’ findings see Lagattuta, 2005). With respect to children’s 
justifications of their emotion attribution responses, Nunner-Winkler & Sodian 
(1988) observed an age effect with more outcome-oriented justifications among 4-
year-olds to more morally-oriented responses to 8-year-olds. In addition to the 
emotion attribution task, the authors conducted a moral judgement task in which the 
children were required to judge the moral worth of two victimizers who differed in 
their emotional reactions in response to successful transgression (feeling happy 
versus feeling sorry). Interestingly, while 4-year-olds’ moral judgements did not 
differ whether a transgressor was feeling happy or sorry after his transgression, 6- 
and 8-year-olds judged the happy victimizer to be worse than the sorry victimizer. In 
their second and third experiment the authors confirmed the robustness of the happy 
victimizer pattern in younger children. In their second experiment 5-year-olds 
showed the happy victimizer pattern even after moral aspects had been made salient 
(e.g., the victim’s physical harm, the victimizer’s tangible profit). Moreover, in their 
third experiment the authors confirmed their hypothesis that young children’s happy 
victimizer responses are restricted to situations where there is a conflict between 
personal motives and moral standards. In the unintentional harm done by a neutral 
actor condition, where there is no conflict between personal motive and moral 
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standards, 5-year-olds appropriately judged the character as not being bad, but as 
feeling bad. Interestingly, in the intentional harm done by ill-motivated actor 
condition, where there is a conflict between the personal immoral motive and the 
moral standard, 5-year-olds judged the transgressor as being bad, but as feeling good. 
Based on younger children’s happy victimizer responses, Nunner-Winkler & Sodian 
(1988) reasoned that, although even young children understand moral rules, they do 
not seem to integrate their moral knowledge into situations where there is a conflict 
between personal goals (to get what one wants) and moral rules (not to transgress). 
Further, the authors argue that younger children’s attribution of positive feelings to 
the victimizer and negative feelings to the ‘moral hero’ primarily seem to be a 
function of the goal-oriented satisfaction of the victimizer’s interests. This hypothesis 
is supported by findings from Wiersma & Laupa (2000) who found no happy 
victimizer effect in 3- to 5-year-olds in scenarios where a person transgresses without 
an explicitly specified goal. Moreover, Nunner-Winkler & Sodian (1988) argued that 
older children’s attribution of negative feelings to the transgressor and positive 
feelings to the ‘moral hero’ is a function of more morally-oriented considerations. 
Subsequent research on the happy victimizer phenomenon showed that the 
attributional reversal from younger children’s happy victimizer responses to older 
children’s sad victimizer responses observed in earlier studies (Barden et al., 1980; 
Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988) turned out to be more complex and subtle. For 
example, several subsequent studies revealed that for primary emotion responses 
(e.g., ‘How does [the victimizer] feel?’) the happy victimizer responses had been 
shown to be based predominately on goal-oriented considerations for younger as well 
as for older children (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lagattuta, 2005; Lourenco, 1997; 
Sokol, 2004; Sokol & Chandler, 2004; Yuill et al., 1996), and had been observed to 
persist even into adolescence and adulthood (Lagattuta, 2005; Murgatroyd & 
Robinson, 1993; Murgatroyd & Robinson, 1997). Interestingly, primary emotion 
responses had been shown to vary with the interview procedure (Sokol, 2004; Sokol 
& Chandler, 2004; Yuill et al., 1996). For example, Sokol and colleagues (2004) 
showed that when the interview procedure focused on more goal-oriented aspects 
(e.g., ‘How does [the victimizer] feel?’), as is the case in the traditional interview 
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procedure on the happy victimizer research, all 5- to 7-year-olds’ primary emotion 
judgements revealed happy victimizer responses. In contrast, when the interview 
focused more on moral aspects (e.g., ‘How does [the victimizer] feel about acting 
like that?’), 5- to 7-year-olds judged the victimizer to feel sad as their primary 
emotion response. Not only are primary emotion responses affected by the interview 
procedure, but also adolescents’ primary emotion attributions with respect to the self 
(e.g., ‘Imagine you did what [the victimizer] did. How would you feel afterwards?’) 
were observed to be a function of social desirability responses (Krettenauer & 
Eichler, 2006).  
While primary emotion responses have shown to be a function of the interview 
procedure and of social desirability considerations, secondary emotion responses 
(e.g., ‘What else does [the victimizer] feel?’) had turned out to rather robustly 
measure the happy victimizer phenomenon in young children (Arsenio & Kramer, 
1992; Lagattuta, 2005; Lourenco, 1997; Sokol, 2004; Sokol & Chandler, 2004; Yuill 
et al., 1996). For example, Arsenio & Kramer (1992) were the first who integrated a 
secondary emotion probe into their interview protocol. While for the first emotion 
probe the majority of 4- to 8-year-olds gave happy victimizer responses based on 
predominately goal-oriented considerations, for the secondary emotion probe the 
authors observed an age effect. While the majority of the 4-year-olds persisted to 
give happy victimizer responses also when they had the opportunity to further reflect 
on the victimizer’s feelings, 6- and 8-year-olds compared to 4-year-olds provided 
significantly more opposite valenced, moral emotions (e.g., the victimizer feels sad). 
Furthermore, the attributional shift from happy to sad victimizer responses were not 
as sharp as was observed in the early research on the happy victimizer phenomenon. 
While the majority of the 8-year-olds provided moral emotion responses when 
probed with the least directive probe (e.g. ‘Do you think the actor could be feeling 
anything else?’), the majority of the 6-year-olds justified the victimizer to feel sad for 
the most directive probe question (e.g., ‘You said your friend [the victimizer] would 
be happy when he got your swing. What if he looked at you on the ground and saw 
that you were very sad, could he feel anything else besides happy?’). Arsenio & 
Kramer (1992) concluded that there seems to be a more subtle shift from 4-year-olds’ 
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judgements that victimizers are simply happy to 8-year-olds’ tendency to view 
victimizers as feeling more mixed or conflicting emotions. Further evidence that 
children’s secondary emotion responses are a more valid measure for detecting age 
related changes in their happy victimizer responses comes from Sokol’s (2004) 
doctoral thesis, who observed significant relationships between cognitive processes 
that may underlie the happy victimizer responses only when taking into account the 
children’s secondary emotion responses. 
A recent study explored the happy victimizer phenomenon in greater detail and 
extended research to prohibitive rule situations (Lagattuta, 2005). First, the author 
compared 4- to 7-year-olds’ emotion predictions and explanations with adult 
responses in both transgression and willpower trials. Second, responses in prohibitive 
rule scenarios were compared with emotion predictions and explanations in simple, 
rule-free situations where a neutral desire was either fulfilled or unfulfilled. Third, in 
addition to the trials where participants had to predict and explain a character’s 
feelings (predict-and-explain-trials), Lagattuta (2005) presented trials where 
participants had to provide explanations for a character’s feelings in response to 
transgression and willpower situations (explain-only-trials). Fourth, connections 
between emotion predictions and emotion explanations were assessed.  
With respect to emotion attribution in transgression trials, Lagattuta (2005) 
showed that also in prohibitive rule scenarios there is an attributional shift from 
positive emotions to mixed emotions between 4 and 7 years. Moreover, while in 
willpower scenarios 5-year-olds reported more ‘sad moral hero’ emotions; 7-year-
olds attributed more mixed emotions. Further, the author also showed that for the 
primary emotion response not only the majority of children but also almost all adults 
attributed positive emotions to transgression trials and negative emotions to 
willpower scenes. In contrast, for the secondary emotion probe only from seven 
years on significantly more mixed emotions were reported. With respect to emotion 
explanations, there was no age effect for goal-oriented justifications. However, for 
rule-oriented (e.g., ‘Because he listened to the rule’) and future-oriented explanations 
(e.g., ‘Because she might have gotten hurt if she had done it.’) a developmental 
effect was observed. Rule-oriented explanations were significantly more often 
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provided by 7-year-olds and adults compared to 4- and 5-year-olds. Interestingly, 7-
year-olds provided future-oriented explanations more often than did any other age 
group. Moreover, most of the future-oriented explanations focused on possible 
negative outcomes for the self or potential negative outcomes for others rather than 
references with respect to harm or punishment. 
In addition to transgression trials, Lagattuta (2005) included simple desire stories. 
With respect to emotional intensity ratings four- and five-year-olds, as with 7-year-
olds and adults, predicted that a person whose desire was fulfilled in no-rule 
scenarios would feel significantly better than those whose desire was fulfilled in the 
transgression trials. Furthermore, four- and five-year-olds, as with 7-year-olds and 
adults, judged a character to feel significantly worse in rule-free situations where its 
desire has been blocked than in moral situations where the character has chosen to 
refrain from desire fulfilment. These results show that, although younger children do 
not seem to be able to provide mixed emotion responses to transgressors and 
willpower actors, they seem to have some first insight that the basic relationship 
between neutral desires and emotions (e.g., goal fulfilment = feeling good; goal-
blocked = feeling bad) is modified by rule considerations. 
In addition to transgression vignettes where participants had to predict and explain 
the transgressor’s emotion, Lagattuta (2005) hypothesized that the inclusion of 
predict-only-trials would make it easier for younger children to integrate the 
influence of rule considerations into their justifications for transgression and 
willpower judgements. This was the case for 5-year-olds’ rule-oriented explanations. 
That is, 5-year-olds provided significantly more rule-oriented explanations when 
they were asked to explain why a character is feeling sad after transgression and why 
he is feeling good after willpower behaviour than when they had to both predict and 
explain the character’s feelings. Interestingly, 4-year-olds did not profit from this 
explanation-only method. Moreover, the combined explanations for both the predict-
and-explain and the explain-only trials showed that 4-year-olds compared 7-year olds 
and adults provided significantly more goal-oriented explanations.  
Finally, Lagattuta (2005) assessed the connections between emotion predictions 
and emotion explanations. Children and adults showed a consistent link between 
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emotion prediction and explanation type, even when controlled for age. That is, more 
rule- and future-oriented explanations were provided when a transgressor was judged 
to feel bad and a ‘moral hero’ to feel good than when the transgressor was judged to 
feel good and the ‘moral hero’ to feel sad. Furthermore, children and adults 
explained emotions in relation to characters’ goals more often after desire-outcome 
match than after desire-outcome mismatch trials. 
In sum, Lagattuta (2005) generalizes previous research findings on the happy 
victimizer phenomenon to prohibitive rule situations by showing that children under 
7 years are impaired in attributing mixed emotions to transgressors and willpower 
actors. Moreover, she showed that, although goal-oriented explanations were 
predominately observed even in the adult sample, 4-year-olds provided significantly 
more goal-oriented explanations than 7-year-olds and adults. Interestingly, she 
observed that despite their deficits, even young children seem to have some 
knowledge with respect to the fact that rule considerations can decrease the 
emotional intensity to which a person feels happy in transgression situations and to 
which a character feels sad in ‘moral hero scenarios’, compared to simple rule-free 
scenarios. Moreover, 5-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, are able to provide twice as 
many rule-oriented explanations when they had to explain a character’s feelings than 
when they had to predict and explain it.  
While Lagattuta (2005) extended the happy victimizer research to prohibitive rule 
situations, another recent study explored cultural effects on the happy victimizer 
phenomenon by comparing German with Portuguese children (Keller et al., 2003). In 
addition, the authors investigated whether happy victimizer responses are a function 
of whether emotions had to be attributed to the victimizer or to the self (e.g., ‘How 
would you feel if you had done that?’). First, the authors observed a main effect of 
culture on the emotions attributed both to the self and the victimizer. German 
children attributed more negative emotions than Portuguese children both to the self 
and to the victimizer. Second, the authors observed an age-related self-other split in 
emotion attribution. Although both 5-year-olds and 8-year-olds attributed more 
negative emotions to the self than to the victimizer, older children compared to 
younger children attributed more negative emotions to both the self and the 
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victimizer. The finding on the self-other-split, however, has to be interpreted with 
caution because, at least for the older children, the self-other differentiation observed 
in emotion judgements during victimizer scenarios could also be a function of social 
desirability responses (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006).  
While most researchers on the happy victimizer phenomenon have speculated 
about the specific nature of the cognitive constraints that may underlie younger 
children’s inability to provide mixed emotions in situations where one’s personal 
desire conflicts with moral standards, only few have directly tested possible 
underlying constraints. Arsenio & Lover (1995) have speculated that young 
children’s inability to attribute conflicting emotions to a victimizer may be a function 
of an immature Theory of Mind development (also see Astington, 2004). This 
assumption has been tested in several recent studies (Baird & Astington, 2004; 
Sokol, 2004; Sokol & Chandler, 2004; Sokol et al., 2004). For example, in his 
doctoral thesis Sokol (2004; also see Sokol & Chandler, 2004) observed a 
relationship between young children’s happy victimizer responses and the 
development of an interpretive ToM understanding. In addition to the false belief 
task, ToM development can be measured by tasks that vary in their interpretational 
complexity (Lalonde & Chandler, 2002). As suggested by Sodian & Thoermer 
(2006), a more simple interpretive ToM understanding is supposed to require one to 
understand that a person who has false information about reality will interpret reality 
falsely, as measured by the false belief task. In contrast, a more complex 
interpretative ToM understanding is supposed to require one to understand that 
identical reality information can be interpreted differently from different 
perspectives, as measured by the droodle task which only allows a restricted view on 
reality (‘droodle-task’: e.g., a restricted view on the picture depicting ‘a ship arriving 
too late to save a drowning witch’). While a more simple interpretive ToM 
understanding develops between 4- to 5-years, a more complex interpretative ToM 
understanding develops at the age of 6 to 7 years. Coming back to Sokol (2004), he 
observed that the development of an interpretive ToM understanding, as measured by 
the droodle task, is a function of attributing mixed emotions to victimizers. When 
controlled for age, children with an interpretive ToM understanding were more likely 
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to attribute mixed victimizer emotions. That the development of an interpretative 
ToM understanding was a significant predictor for judging a victimizer to feel mixed 
emotions, was further supported by the fact that the age by ToM correlation, when 
controlled for emotion attribution, remained significant, but not the age by emotion 
attribution, when the ToM factor was partialled out. Interestingly, in the non happy-
victimizer condition, emotion attribution and ToM development no longer correlated 
when controlled for age. That ToM development is an important predictor for 
attributing mixed emotions to victimizers is further supported by another study from 
Sokol et al. (2004). They presented 5- to 7-year-olds a series of slapstick films, in 
which a puppet character named Punch attempts to harm another character named 
Judy. The films depicted two attempted, but failed, murder scenes, in which Punch 
had every intention of harming Judy. Both interpretive and non-interpretive children 
adequately responded to questions about Punch’s subversive intention. However, 
when controlled for age, children with an interpretive ToM, as measured by the 
droodle task, rated Punch’s action as significantly more harshly than non-interpretive 
children.  
The studies from Sokol and colleagues show that the development of an 
interpretive ToM understanding predicts the attribution of mixed emotions to 
victimizers. More evidence on young children’s inability to interpret the same reality 
cue differently comes from another recent study (Baird & Astington, 2004). The 
authors tested 4- to 7-year-olds’ ability to evaluate the same action (e.g., two 
characters turning on a hose) differently in relation to the actor’s intention (bad 
motive condition: e.g., ‘Susan’s brother had built a sand castle in the backyard, and 
Susan wanted the sand castle to collapse’; neutral motive condition: e.g., ‘Jessica’s 
mother had planted some seeds in the backyard, and Jessica wanted to help take care 
of the garden’). Interestingly, 4-year-olds were significantly worse than both 5- and 
7-year-olds at differentiating the character’s actions in terms of moral quality. In 
contrast, 5- and 7-year-olds were equally skilled at assigning different moral 
evaluations to characters performing identical actions. Furthermore, 4-year-olds were 
significantly worse than both 5- and 7-year-olds at differentiating the character’s 
actions in terms of punishment ratings. In contrast, 5- and 7-year-olds were equally 
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skilled in their punishment ratings. In addition, when controlled for age, the authors 
observed a positive correlation between children’s false belief understanding and 
their ability to differently evaluate the same action with respect to moral parameters 
and punishment ratings.  
In sum, research on the happy victimizer phenomenon shows that around the age 
of 6 to 7 years there is a subtle, developmental change from providing happy 
victimizer responses to providing more mixed emotions to victimizer. This change, 
however, is not as sharp as was observed in early research. Children as well as adults 
show a goal-oriented happy victimizer pattern as their primary emotion response. 
Before age 6 to 7, however, when asked to provide additional emotion responses, 
children predominately pertain to the happy victimizer responses. Above this age 
children and adults provide more mixed emotions based on more morally-oriented, 
rule-oriented, and future-oriented responses. Furthermore, young children’s happy 
victimizer responses seem to be a general phenomenon since it has been shown not 
only in transgression but also in willpower scenarios, and not only in physical harm 
situations, but also in other situations such as stealing, lying, and prohibitive-rule 
situations. In addition, more recent research has shown that young children’s 
inability to attribute mixed feelings to victimizers is likely a function of an immature 
interpretive ToM understanding. However, whether false belief understanding and 
emotion attribution based on integrating moral considerations into intention-
outcome-relations is associated with common or different neural networks remains to 
be explored. 
 
5.2 Neuroimaging findings on the processing of transgression scenarios 
By now, the majority of neuroimaging studies on moral reasoning have concentrated 
on the neural network associated with the processing of moral dilemmas (Greene & 
Haidt, 2002; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Heekeren, 
Wartenburger, Schmidt, Schwintowski, & Villringer, 2003; Schaich, Hynes, Van, 
Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006), immoral statements (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, 
Bramati, & Grafman, 2002; Takahashi et al., 2004), pictures (Moll et al., 2002), or 
 75
  Study II – Introduction 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
scripts (Shin et al., 2000). Therefore, this is the first neuroimaging study which 
explores the brain regions implicated in emotion attribution based on integrating 
other’s immoral intentions into intention-outcome-relations. Thereby, this study 
particularly focuses on the investigation of brain regions implicated in the processing 
of mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled moral transgression scenarios. Currently, 
three studies have investigated the neural correlates associated with self-attributed 
moral emotions in transgression scenarios (Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002; 
Finger, Marsh, Kamel, Mitchell, & Blair, 2006; Kedia, Berthoz, Wessa, Hilton, & 
Martinot, 2008). Out of these three studies, only Berthoz et al. (2002) and Finger et 
al. (2006) aimed at exploring brain regions associated with emotion attribution 
inferred from intended compared to unintended transgression. For example, Berthoz 
et al. (2002) showed that the processing of statements depicting intentional versus 
unintentional social transgressions was associated with activity in the rostral part of 
the medial prefrontal cortex, the dorsal part of the anterior cingulate and 
paracingulate cortex, the superior prefrontal cortex including the premotor cortex, 
and the inferior parietal cortex. Further, Finger et al. (2006) observed that intentional 
moral transgression compared to unintentional social transgression was associated 
with activity in the dorsal part of the medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the dorso- 
and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the premotor cortex and the temporal cortex. 
However, the results of the Finger et al. (2006) study have to be interpreted with 
caution because the intention and the transgression factor are confounded. In sum, 
results of both studies suggest that self-attributed emotions based on intentional 
versus unintentional transgression seem to be associated with activity in the 
prefrontal cortex, particularly the dorsal and rostral part of the medial prefrontal 
cortex as well as premotor brain regions. 
Because the ability to reason about false beliefs and the ability to integrate moral 
considerations into the processing of intention-outcome-relations have been observed 
to be developmentally closely connected, a recent fMRI study investigated the neural 
network involved in the interaction between false belief reasoning and moral 
judgements in intention-outcome-scenarios (Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 
2007). The authors presented scenarios where an immoral actor behaved based on 
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either a true or false belief about reality. In the true belief scenario, the victimizer’s 
immoral intention was related to a negative outcome (intended harm). In the false 
belief scenario, its immoral intention was related to a positive outcome (attempted 
harm). Actors that held a neutral intention also acted based on either a true or false 
belief about reality. While in the true belief scenarios, the character’s neutral 
behaviour resulted in a positive outcome (no-harm), in the false belief scenes its 
neutral behaviour resulted in a negative outcome (unintended harm). Intention by 
outcome interactions were analysed in functional ROIs in those brain regions 
supposed to be associated with belief reasoning, as was measured by a false belief 
versus false photograph contrast. The authors observed that the right temporo-
parietal-junction (RTPJ) and the DMPFC showed an activity increase for moral 
judgements based on attempted harm compared to intended harm and compared to 
no-harm vignettes (for similar results see Young & Saxe, 2008). These findings 
suggest that brain regions implicated in false belief reasoning seem to be recruited 
for moral judgements in those cases where a victimizer’s behaviour was based on a 
false belief about reality as in the attempted harm trials. In contrast, when a 
victimizer’s behaviour was based on a true belief, as in the intended harm scenarios, 
the DMPFC and the RTPJ seem to be less associated with the processing of moral 
transgression. These findings, however, do not support other results which show 
DMPFC activity during emotion attribution also in cases where a victimizer fulfills 
its immoral intention based on a true belief about reality (Berthoz et al., 2002; Finger 
et al., 2006). The diverging findings could be due to differences in analysis methods 
(fROI analysis versus whole brain analysis). Further, the divergence could be due to 
differences with respect to the tasks: self-related emotion attributions (Berthoz et al., 
2002; Finger et al., 2006) versus other-related moral judgements (Young et al., 
2007). Alternatively, the diverging findings could also be due to differences in the 
salience of the intention-outcome-relation. While in the studies of Berthoz et al. 
(2002) and Finger et al. (2006) the intention-outcome-relation was not made explicit, 
in the study of Young et al. (2007) the intention-outcome-relation was made explicit. 
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5.3 Summary and research question 
The first study explored emotion attribution based on intention-outcome-relations. 
To go a step further on exploring intention-based emotion attribution, the present 
study is the first that investigates the neural network involved in emotion attribution 
based on the integration of an actor’s immoral intention into intention-outcome-
relations. Interestingly, this ability develops after the ability to attribute emotions 
inferred from intention-outcome-relations and it even follows the development of 
false belief understanding.  
Based on developmental findings on the happy victimizer phenomenon, it is 
hypothesised that particularly for fulfilled immoral intentions adults would give 
mixed emotion responses. Further, it is hypothesised that similar information 
processes would be associated with emotion attribution based on immoral intentions 
relative to emotion attribution based on neutral intentions. Based on the findings 
from experiment 1, particularly premotor brain regions, along with the dorso- and 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, as well as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex are 
predicted to be recruited during emotion attribution based on this integration process. 
Beyond, developmental evidence suggests that the ability for emotion attribution 
based on integrating immoral intentions into intention-outcome-relations is a 
function of a developing ToM understanding. This finding is reflected on 
neuroimaging level because brain regions that are implicated in ToM, particularly the 
DMPFC, have been observed to be also involved in emotion attribution based on 
transgression scenarios. Therefore, it is predicted that emotion attribution based on 
the integration of immoral intentions into intention-outcome-relations would also be 
associated with activity in the DMPFC. 
To explore emotion attribution based on immoral intentions, cartoon stories with 
verbal vignettes were presented. The material was adopted from developmental 
studies on the happy victimizer phenomenon (Yuill et al., 1996). The nonverbal 
material was held equivalent across the experimental conditions, which only differed 
in their verbal vignettes. A 2 by 2 factorial design was used. The factor ‘intention’ 
varied on whether the protagonist held a neutral or immoral intention. The factor 
‘intention-outcome-relation’ varied on whether the protagonist’s intention matched 
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or mismatched the outcome situation. Besides the emotion attribution conditions, a 
non-mental control condition was used that solely described physical processes. 
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6. METHODS 
STUDY II 
EMOTIONS INFERRED FROM THE INTEGRATION OF IMMORAL 
INTENTIONS INTO INTENTION-OUTCOME-RELATIONS 
 
 
6.1 Participants 
Eighteen right-handed subjects (10 females, 8 males, age range = 18-20 years, M = 
19.44 years, SD = .78 years) with no neurological or psychiatric history participated 
in the study. All gave informed consent according to the guidelines of the local Ethic 
Committee. 
 
6.2 Task and material 
Analogous to experiment 1, intention-based emotion attribution was explored by a 
modified, fMRI compatible version adopted from the developmental study of Yuill et 
al. (1996). Cartoons were presented which were described by verbal vignettes. The 
nonverbal pictures depicted three children playing, a protagonist and two recipients 
(Figs. 6.1 to 6.3). Eight story contexts were used: children playing with a ball, a 
teddy, a balloon, a toy airplane, a toy duck, a toy car, badminton, or hockey. The 
nonverbal material was held equivalent across the study conditions, which only 
differed in their verbal vignettes. For the emotion attribution conditions a 2 x 2 
factorial design was used with the within subject factors ‘intention’ (neutral 
intention, immoral intention) and ‘intention-outcome-relation’ (match: Fulfilled 
Intention, mismatch: Unfulfilled Intention). The factor ‘intention-outcome-relation’ 
varied on whether the protagonist’s intention matched (fulfilled intention) or 
mismatched the outcome situation (unfulfilled intention). The intention factor varied 
on whether the protagonist held a neutral (Fig. 6.1) or immoral intention (Fig. 6.2). 
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Besides emotion attribution conditions, a non-mental control condition (Non-Ment) 
was used that solely described physical processes (Fig. 6.3). 
In the emotion attribution conditions, the verbal vignette in the first story picture 
described the protagonist’s intention (neutral intention: e.g. ‘Max wants to throw the 
ball to Lena’; immoral intention: e.g. ‘Max wants to hurt Lena with the ball’). The 
second story picture presented the outcome of the intended action (fulfilled neutral 
intention: e.g., ‘Max throws the ball to Lena’; unfulfilled neutral intention: e.g., ‘Max 
throws the ball to Paul’; fulfilled immoral intention: e.g. ‘Max hurts Lena with the 
ball’; unfulfilled immoral intention: e.g. ‘Max hurts Paul with the ball’). In the third 
picture the protagonist was depicted and the participants were instructed to reason 
about the protagonist’s emotion dependent on its prior intention and on the outcome 
of the intended actions (e.g., ‘How does Max feel?’). To separate reasoning about the 
actor’s emotion from giving a motor response, participants were instructed not to 
respond before the response stimulus was presented. The response stimulus depicted 
two smileys (positive, negative). Responses were given by pressing a button.  
In the reality condition verbal vignettes in the first two pictures described the 
scene (e.g., picture 1: ‘The kids are playing with the puck’; picture 2: ‘Max has the 
puck’). In the third picture participants were instructed to reason about the toy the 
kids were playing with (‘What is Lena playing with?’). In the response stimulus the 
target toy was presented along with one distracter toys. Here, participants were 
instructed to respond to the target toy by pressing a button. 
For each condition 20 trials were presented. Stimulus complexity was held 
equivalent across conditions. The protagonist’s and the recipients’ gender was 
counterbalanced, as well as the protagonist’s presentation side on the screen 
(left/right). All children were presented without a facial expression in order not to 
trigger specific emotion attribution processes by the visual input. In the response 
trials the presentation order of the smileys and of the toys was counterbalanced.  
In order to obtain more specific emotion attribution responses, a rating task was 
conducted following the scanning session (Appendix B). In the rating task the same 
cartoon-stories were presented as during the fMRI session and the same emotion 
attribution conditions were used. In each emotion attribution condition four to five 
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trials were presented. Participants were instructed to rate the actor’s emotion on eight 
emotion dimensions (happiness, pride, satisfaction, schadenfreude, surprise, 
embarrassment, sadness, anger). Each dimension varied on a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong).  
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Emotions inferred from a 
fulfilled neutral intention 
Emotions inferred from an 
unfulfilled neutral intention 
Intention  
(Picture 1; 3 sec) 
Outcome  
Anna wants to throw the toy plane 
to Paul 
Max wants to throw the ball to Lena 
Anna throws the toy plane to Marie Max throws the ball to Lena 
(Picture 2; 3 sec ) 
Fig. 6.1: Example of emotions inferred from a fulfilled neutral intention (left) and an 
unfulfilled neutral intention (right). Pictures were consecutively presented with 
intermediate fixation periods varying in time intervals. Functional analysis focused on 
the emotion attribution stimuli (picture 3). 
How does Max feel? How does Anna feel? 
Response  
(Picture 4; 1.5 sec) 
Emotion-
Attribution 
(Picture 3; 3 sec) 
+ + 
+ 
Fixation (0.5-2 sec) 
+ Fixation (2 sec) 
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Emotions inferred from an 
unfulfilled immoral intention 
Fig. 6.2: Example of emotions inferred from a fulfilled immoral intention (left) and an 
unfulfilled immoral intention (right). Pictures were consecutively presented with 
intermediate fixation periods varying in time intervals. Functional analysis focused on 
the emotion attribution stimuli (picture 3). 
Max wants to hurt Lena with the ball 
Emotions inferred from an 
fulfilled immoral intention 
Max hurts Lena with the ball 
Anna wants to hurt Paul with the toy 
plane
Anna hurts Marie with the toy plane 
How does Max feel? How does Anna feel? 
Response  
(Picture 4; 1.5 sec) 
Emotion-
Attribution 
(Picture 3; 3 sec) 
Intention  
(Picture 1; 3 sec) 
Outcome  
(Picture 2; 3 sec ) 
Fixation (0.5-2 sec) 
Fixation (2 sec) 
+ + 
+ + 
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Fig. 6.3: Example of a reality judgement trial. Pictures were consecutively presented 
with intermediate fixation periods varying in time intervals. Functional analysis 
focused on the reality processing stimuli (picture 3). 
Reality Judgement 
Response  
(Picture 4; 1.5 sec) 
Reality 
Processing 
(Picture 3; 3 sec) 
+ 
+ 
The kids are playing with the puck 
Max has the puck 
Reality 
(Picture 2; 3 sec ) 
Reality 
(Picture 1; 3 sec) 
Fixation (2 sec) 
What is Lena playing with? 
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 6.3 Experimental procedure 
Prior to the experimental task participants attended a training session to become 
familiar with the stimulus material. Following the fMRI session the rating task was 
conducted. During the fMRI session stimuli were back-projected onto a screen. Foam 
padding restricted head motion. The experimental conditions were randomly 
presented across the scanning session. Within each trial stimuli were presented in a 
fixed order: the story stimuli (pictures 1 and 2) were presented for 3 seconds each. 
The emotion attribution stimulus and the reality processing stimulus (picture 3) were 
presented for 3 seconds each. The response stimulus (picture 4) was presented for 1.5 
seconds. Fixation periods were presented before each trial (2 sec) and before the 
third picture (0.5-2 sec). Fixation periods were included to measure an inter-stimulus 
baseline and to properly model the hemodynamic response function associated with 
emotion attribution. Presentation software was used for stimulus presentation and for 
response recording (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA). Responses were 
recorded by using two buttons of a five-button fMRI compatible response pad 
(LUMItouch, Photon Control Inc., Burnaby, Canada).  
 
6.4 Statistical analysis of the behavioural data 
The statistical analysis of the behavioural data was conducted with SPSS 15. In the 
reality condition response accuracy (in percentage) was analysed. With respect to the 
emotion attribution responses obtained during the scanning session, for every 
emotion dimension (positive, negative) the mean percentage of emotion responses 
out of its total amount was calculated. In the rating task for every emotion dimension 
(happiness, pride, satisfaction, schadenfreude, surprise, embarrassment, sadness, 
anger) a mean rating score ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong) was 
computed. On every emotion dimension statistical analysis was done by conducting a 
repeated measurement Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with a 2 x 2 factorial design: 
‘intention’ (neutral intention, immoral intention) x ‘intention-outcome-relation’ 
(match: fulfilled intention, mismatch: unfulfilled intention). Further statistical 
analysis was done by post-hoc paired t-tests with Greenhouse-Geisser alpha-
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correction. T-tests were two-tailed and a value of p ≤. 05 was used to determine 
statistical significance.  
 
6.5 Imaging and image preprocessing 
Scanning was performed in an interleaved fashion on a 3 Tesla fMRI scanner 
(Siemens Allegra, Erlangen, Germany). The functional images sensitive to blood 
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrasts were acquired by T2*-weighted echo 
planar images (EPI, TR = 2.82 sec, TE = 50 ms, flip angle = 90°, in plane matrix 64 
x 64, FoV = 192 mm). The images consisted of 32 axial slices with 3mm thickness 
and 3 x 3mm in plane resolution. During the scanning 494 volumes were acquired. 
High resolution structural weighted images (TR = 2.25 sec, TE = 2.6 ms, TI = 900 
ms, voxel size 1x1x1mm, 160 axial slices, FoV = 256 mm) were recorded from all 
participants. The scanning session lasted approximately 30 min. 
All images were preprocessed using the SPM5 software package 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), which is based on MATLAB 7.0 software (The 
MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA). For each participant functional images were slice-
timed corrected using the middle slice as reference, realigned to the first volume by 
rigid body transformation to correct for participants’ motion, normalised to the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain (Collins et al., 1994), and 
spatially smoothed by a Gaussian kernel with a full-width half-maximum of 8 mm. 
 
6.6 Statistical analysis of the images 
All statistical first and second-level analysis were conducted with the SPM5 software 
package and were based on the entire brain. The analysis focused on amplitude 
changes in the hemodynamic response function (HRF) associated with emotion 
attribution and reality judgement (picture 3). Fixation periods served to measure an 
inter-stimulus baseline and to analyse the hemodynamic response function associated 
with emotion attribution and reality judgement. 
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In the first-level analysis a fixed effects analysis was computed for each 
participant based on the general linear model (GLM). The stimuli were modelled by 
boxcars of 3 seconds, which were then convolved with the HRF, along with its time 
and dispersion derivatives to account for any temporal and spatial shifts in the 
response of the stimuli (Friston et al., 1998). Also included were six covariates to 
capture residual movement-related artefacts, and a single covariate representing the 
mean (constant) over scans. The data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cutoff 
at 128 seconds. Statistical parametric maps (SPMs) were generated for each subject 
by t-statistics derived from contrasts utilizing the HRF  (Friston et al., 2002). The 
derivates from the statistical model were not included in the contrasts.  
First, these contrasts of interest were computed on the individual analysis level for 
emotion attribution compared to reality judgements: 
Contrast 1: Emotions inferred from fulfilled neutral intentions versus reality 
judgement (‘Fulfilled Neutral Intention’ versus ‘Non-Ment’) 
Contrast 2: Emotions inferred from unfulfilled neutral intentions versus reality 
judgement (‘Unfulfilled Neutral Intention’ versus ‘Non-Ment’) 
Contrast 3: Emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions versus reality 
judgement (‘Fulfilled Immoral Intention’ versus ‘Non-Ment’) 
Contrast 4: Emotions inferred from unfulfilled immoral intentions versus 
reality judgement (‘Unfulfilled Immoral Intention’ versus ‘Non-
Ment’); 
Second, these contrasts of interest were computed on the individual analysis level for 
the main effects of the factor ‘intention’ and ‘intention-outcome relation’: 
Contrast 5: Emotions inferred from immoral versus neutral intentions 
(‘Fulfilled Immoral Intention’ + ‘Unfulfilled Immoral Intention’ 
versus ‘Fulfilled Neutral Intention’ + ‘Unfulfilled Neutral 
Intention’) 
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Contrast 6: Emotions inferred from unfulfilled versus fulfilled intentions 
(‘Unfulfilled Neutral Intention’ + ‘Unfulfilled Immoral Intention’ 
versus ‘Fulfilled Neutral Intention’ + ‘Fulfilled Immoral Intention’) 
Finally, these contrasts of interest were computed on the individual analysis level for 
emotion attribution dependent on the factors intention and intention-outcome-
relation: 
Contrast 7: Emotions inferred from unfulfilled neutral intentions versus 
fulfilled neutral intentions (‘Unfulfilled Neutral Intention’ versus 
‘Fulfilled Neutral Intention’) 
Contrast 8: Emotions inferred from unfulfilled immoral intentions versus 
fulfilled immoral intention (‘Unfulfilled Immoral Intention’ versus 
‘Fulfilled Immoral Intention’) 
Contrast 9: Emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions versus fulfilled 
neutral intentions (‘Fulfilled Immoral Intention’ versus ‘Fulfilled 
Neutral Intention’) 
Contrast 10: Emotions inferred from unfulfilled immoral intentions versus 
unfulfilled neutral intentions (‘Unfulfilled Immoral Intention’ 
versus ‘Unfulfilled Neutral Intention’) 
These single-subject first-level contrast images from the weighted beta-images were 
introduced into second-level random-effects analysis to allow for population 
inference. One-sample t-tests were computed to assess functional activity associated 
with emotion attribution compared to reality judgements (contrasts 1 to 4), as well as 
for the main effects of the factors ‘intention’ (contrast 5) and ‘intention-outcome-
relation’ (contrast 6). This study was specifically interested in brain regions showing 
an ‘intention’ by ‘intention-outcome-relation’ interaction effect. To test for 
interaction effects, a one-way ANOVA (including non-sphericity correction) was 
computed including contrasts 1 to 4. Within this ANOVA, an F-contrast was 
computed to test for brain regions showing a significant interaction effect (Henson & 
Penny, 2003). Interaction effects were further analysed by one-sample t-tests 
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(contrasts 7 to 10). All fMRI results reported here are based on voxel statistics 
computed with SPM for the entire brain. The resulting set of significant voxel values 
for each contrast constituted an SPM map. The maps were thresholded at T = 3.79 (p 
≤. 001 uncorrected), overlaid on the MNI template, and labelled by using the MNI 
coordinates. For graphical purposes, in those brain regions showing significant 
effects, mean cluster values (parameter estimates) were extracted by using the SPM5 
software.  
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7. RESULTS 
STUDY II 
EMOTIONS INFERRED FROM THE INTEGRATION OF IMMORAL 
INTENTIONS INTO INTENTION-OUTCOME-RELATIONS 
 
 
7.1 Behavioural findings 
The emotion attribution results obtained during the fMRI session are shown in 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2, as well as in Figure 7.1. Mean accuracy for the reality judgement 
was 93 % (SD  = 3.5 %). The ANOVA on the factors ‘intention’ and ‘intention-
outcome-relation’ showed a significant interaction effect (F(1,17) = 5.69, p ≤. 05), 
and a main effect of ‘intention-outcome-relation’ (F(1,17) = 313.72, p ≤. 001). No 
main effect of ‘intention’ was observed (F(1,17) = 3.65, n.s.). Regarding the main 
effect of ‘intention-outcome-relation’, more positive and less negative emotions were 
attributed after intention-outcome-match trials compared to intention-outcome-
mismatch trials (Tab. 7.1). This main effect was qualified by a significant ‘intention’ 
by ‘intention-outcome-relation’ interaction effect (Tab. 7.2, Fig. 7.1). Post-hoc t-tests 
on the interaction effect revealed that more positive and less negative emotions were 
attributed following a fulfilled neutral intention compared to a fulfilled immoral 
intention (t(13) = 2.20, p ≤. 05,), as well as following a fulfilled neutral intention 
compared to a unfulfilled neutral intention, and a fulfilled immoral intention 
compared to an unfulfilled immoral intention (Fulfilled Neutral Intention versus 
Unfulfilled Neutral Intention: t(17) = 25.41, p ≤. 001; Fulfilled Immoral Intention 
versus Unfulfilled Immoral Intention: t(17) = 12.64, p ≤. 001). In other words, the 
interaction results demonstrate that subjects attributed the greatest amount of positive 
emotions to fulfilled neutral intentions and the greatest amount of negative emotions 
to scenarios depicting an unintended harm (unfulfilled immoral intention). That is, on 
the one hand in the case of intended victimization (fulfilled immoral intention) less 
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positive emotions compared to non-harming fulfilled intentions were attributed. On 
the other hand, however, subjects attributed more positive emotions to intended 
victimization as opposed to unintended harm trials. 
 
Table 7.1: Mean emotion attribution scores of the fMRI session in the intention and in the 
intention-outcome-relation condition. 
Emotiona Intention Intention-Outcome-Relation 
 Neutral 
Intention 
Immoral 
Intention 
Fulfilled Unfulfilled 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Positive 54 (7) 45 (12) 91 (12) 8 (9) 
Negative 46 (7) 55 (12) 9 (12) 92 (9) 
Notes: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.  
 a  Percentage of negative and positive responses out of the total amount of emotion 
responses 
 
Table 7.2: Mean emotion attribution scores of the fMRI session dependent on the factor 
intention (neutral intention, immoral intention) and intention-outcome-relation (match: 
fulfilled intention, mismatch: unfulfilled intention). 
Emotiona Neutral Intention Immoral Intention 
 Fulfilled Unfulfilled Fulfilled Unfulfilled 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Positive 97 (3) 10 (14) 84 (24) 6 (8) 
Negative 3 (3) 90 (14) 16 (24) 94 (8) 
Notes: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.  
 a  Percentage of negative and positive responses out of the total amount of emotion 
responses 
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Fulfilled Intention 
Unfulfilled Intention 
(A) 
(B) 
Fig. 7.1: Mean emotion attribution scores (+/- 1 SE) obtained during the fMRI session. 
Intention by intention-outcome-relation interaction effects were observed for positive 
(A) and negative (B) emotions. 
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More specific emotion attribution results were obtained during the rating task that 
followed the fMRI session (Tabs. 7.3 to 7.6, Figs. 7.2 to 7.4). Emotion ratings were 
obtained from the emotions happiness, pride, satisfaction, schadenfreude, surprise, 
embarrassment, sadness, and anger. Rating scores ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(very strong). All emotions showed a main effect of ‘intention-outcome-relation’ 
(Tab. 7.3 and 7.5, Fig. 7.2A). More happiness, pride, satisfaction, and schadenfreude 
were attributed after intention-outcome-match trials than intention-outcome-
mismatch trials. In contrast, more surprise, embarrassment, sadness, and anger were 
attributed following intention-outcome mismatch trials compared to intention-
outcome match trials. Moreover, all emotions except surprise and anger showed a 
main effect of intention (Tab. 7.3 and 7.5, Fig. 7.2B). For immoral compared to 
neutral intentions less happiness, pride, and satisfaction, and more embarrassment 
(Fig. 7.3A), sadness (Fig. 7.3B), but also more schadenfreude were attributed. 
Furthermore, for the emotions happiness, pride, satisfaction, and schadenfreude main 
effects were qualified by intention x intention-outcome-relation interaction effects 
(Tab. 7.5 and 7.4, Fig. 7.4). Post-hoc t-tests showed that more happiness, pride, and 
satisfaction were attributed following a fulfilled neutral intention compared to a 
fulfilled immoral intention, as well as following a fulfilled neutral intention 
compared to an unfulfilled neutral intention, and a fulfilled immoral intention 
compared to an unfulfilled immoral intention (Tab. 7.6, Fig. 7.4A-C). In other words, 
for the emotions happiness, pride and satisfaction the rating results revealed a similar 
pattern as for the behavioural results obtained during the fMRI session. Subjects 
attributed the greatest intensity of these emotions to fulfilled neutral intentions and 
the least intensity to unfulfilled immoral intentions. That is, on the one hand in the 
case of intended victimization (fulfilled immoral intentions) less happiness, pride, 
and satisfaction were attributed as opposed to non-harming fulfilled intentions. On 
the other hand, however, subjects attributed significantly more happiness, pride, and 
satisfaction to intended victimization compared to unintended harm trials. Moreover, 
the interaction effect on the immoral emotion schadenfreude revealed that 
schadenfreude was attributed significantly more often following intended 
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victimization compared to both non-harming trials and unintended victimization 
scenarios (Tab. 7.6, Fig. 7.4D). 
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Fulfilled Intention 
Unfulfilled Intention 
Neutral Intention 
Immoral Intention 
Fig.7.2: Main effects of the factors intention-outcome relation (A) and intention (B) in the 
rating task. Rating scores range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong).  
 
 96
  Study II – Results 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 97
Fulfilled Intention 
Unfulfilled Intention 
(A) (B) 
Embarrassment Sadness 
Fig. 7.3: Main effects of intention in the rating task for embarrassment (A) and sadness 
(B). Rating scores range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong).  
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Unfulfilled Intention 
Fulfilled Intention 
(A) (B) 
(D) (C) 
Happiness Pride 
Satisfaction Schadenfreude 
Fig. 7.4: Intention by intention-outcome relation interaction effects in the rating task. 
Rating scores range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong).  
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Table 7.3: Mean emotion attribution scores of the rating task in the intention and in the 
intention-outcome-relation condition. 
Emotiona Intention Intention-Outcome-Relation 
 Neutral 
Intention 
Immoral 
Intention 
Fulfilled Unfulfilled 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Happiness 3.06 (.59) 1.95 (.66) 3.61 (.77) 1.41 (.46) 
Pride 2.85 (.48) 2.21 (.73) 3.92 (.83) 1.14 (.23) 
Satisfaction 2.91 (.32) 2.56 (.63) 4.34 (.67) 1.13 (.22) 
Schadenfreude 1.15 (.31) 2.83 (.93) 2.75 (.65) 1.23 (.54) 
Surprise 2.63 (.42) 2.86 (.57) 1.64 (.83) 3.85 (.48) 
Embarrassment 2.26 (.51) 3.04 (.52) 1.49 (.49) 3.82 (.73) 
Sadness 1.99 (.58) 2.61 (.54) 1.25 (.36) 3.35 (.83) 
Anger 2.33 (.57) 2.60 (.59) 1.30 (.53) 3.63 (.72) 
Notes: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.  
 a  Emotion ratings ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong). 
 
 
Table 7.4: Mean emotion attribution scores of the rating task dependent on the factors 
intention (neutral intention, immoral intention) and intention-outcome-relation (match: 
fulfilled intention, mismatch: unfulfilled intention). 
Emotiona Neutral Intention Immoral Intention 
 Fulfilled Unfulfilled Fulfilled Unfulfilled 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Happiness 4.46 (0.60) 1.67 (0.94) 2.75 (1.15) 1.15 (0.38) 
Pride 4.50 (0.73) 1.19 (0.42) 3.33 (1.34) 1.09 (0.27) 
Satisfaction 4.68 (0.49) 1.14 (0.33) 4.00 (1.14) 1.11 (0.34) 
Schadenfreude 1.30 (0.63) 1.00 (0.00) 4.19 (1.34) 1.46 (1.07) 
Surprise 1.59 (0.88) 3.67 (0.66) 1.69 (0.89) 4.04 (0.64) 
Embarrassment 1.17 (0.40) 3.36 (1.04) 1.81 (0.81) 4.28 (0.65) 
Sadness 1.00 (0.00) 2.97 (1.16) 1.50 (0.73) 3.72 (1.02) 
Anger 1.07 (0.31) 3.58 (1.02) 1.53 (0.93) 3.67 (0.82) 
Notes: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.  
 a  Emotion ratings ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong). 
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Table 7.5: ANOVA for the emotion attribution results from the rating task. 
Emotion F-value  
(df = 1, 17) 
p-value 
Happiness   
Intention 34.76 ≤ .001 
Intention-Outcome-Relation 125.18 ≤ .001 
Intention x Intention-Outcome-Relation 13.98 ≤ .01 
Pride   
Intention 11.45 ≤ .01 
Intention-Outcome-Relation 226.27 ≤ .001 
Intention x Intention-Outcome-Relation 11.19 ≤ .01 
Satisfaction   
Intention 4.47 ≤ .05 
Intention-Outcome-Relation 353.01 ≤ .001 
Intention x Intention-Outcome-Relation 7.79 ≤ .05 
Schadenfreude   
Intention 45.68 ≤ .001 
Intention-Outcome-Relation 68.96 ≤ .001 
Intention x Intention-Outcome-Relation 32.76 ≤ .001 
Surprise   
Intention 3.04 n.s. 
Intention-Outcome-Relation 74.60 ≤ .001 
Intention x Intention-Outcome-Relation 1.33 n.s. 
Embarrassment   
Intention 27.37 ≤ .001 
Intention-Outcome-Relation 109.95 ≤ .001 
Intention x Intention-Outcome-Relation .96 n.s. 
Sadness   
Intention 13.88 ≤ .01 
Intention-Outcome-Relation 87.92 ≤ .001 
Intention x Intention-Outcome-Relation .372 n.s. 
Anger   
Intention 2.71 n.s. 
Intention-Outcome-Relation 130.07 ≤ .001 
Intention x Intention-Outcome-Relation 1.03 n.s. 
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Table 7.6: Post-hoc t-test results on the rating task to further analyse intention by intention-
outcome-relation interaction effects. 
Emotion t-value  
(df = 17) 
p-value 
Happiness   
Fulfilled Neutral Intention vs Fulfilled Immoral Intention 3.60 ≤ .01 
Unfulfilled Neutral Intention vs Unfulfilled Immoral Intention .80 n.s. 
Fulfilled Neutral Intention vs Unfulfilled Neutral Intention 19.56 ≤ .001 
Fulfilled Immoral Intention vs Unfulfilled Immoral Intention 7.47 ≤ .001 
Pride   
Fulfilled Neutral Intention vs Fulfilled Immoral Intention 7.31 ≤ .001 
Unfulfilled Neutral Intention vs Unfulfilled Immoral Intention 1.20 n.s. 
Fulfilled Neutral Intention vs Unfulfilled Neutral Intention 11.38 ≤ .001 
Fulfilled Immoral Intention vs Unfulfilled Immoral Intention 6.15 ≤ .001 
Satisfaction   
Fulfilled Neutral Intention vs Fulfilled Immoral Intention 2.59 ≤ .05 
Unfulfilled Neutral Intention vs Unfulfilled Immoral Intention .23 n.s. 
Fulfilled Neutral Intention vs Unfulfilled Neutral Intention 27.47 ≤ .001 
Fulfilled Immoral Intention vs Unfulfilled Immoral Intention 10.94 ≤ .001 
Schadenfreude   
Fulfilled Neutral Intention vs Fulfilled Immoral Intention 7.48 ≤ .001 
Unfulfilled Neutral Intention vs Unfulfilled Immoral Intention 1.83 n.s. 
Fulfilled Neutral Intention vs Unfulfilled Neutral Intention 2.01 n.s. 
Fulfilled Immoral Intention vs Unfulfilled Immoral Intention 7.43 ≤ .001 
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7.2 Neuroimaging findings 
FMRI results are listed in Tables 7.7 to 7.10 and are shown in Figures 7.5 to 7.7. 
With respect to emotions inferred from neutral intentions, the results from the first 
experiment were mainly confirmed. That is, particularly emotions inferred from 
unfulfilled neutral intentions compared to reality judgements were associated with a 
signal increase in the medial part of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA, 
BA 6), as well as the left dorsolateral (DLPFC, BA 9) and left ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC, BA 47, Tab. 7.7). With respect to emotions inferred from 
immoral intentions, specifically emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions 
compared to reality judgements were associated with an activity increase in the 
medial pre-SMA, the left dorsolateral (BA 9) and the left ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (BA 47), as well as a brain region at the transition between the right insula and 
the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 13/45, Tab. 7.7). Emotions inferred from 
unfulfilled immoral intentions compared to reality judgements were associated with 
an activity increase in the dorsal paracingulate cortex (BA 32), the left dorsolateral 
(BA 9) and the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47), as well as the right insula 
(BA 13). 
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Table 7.7: Brain regions showing significant functional signal changes associated with 
emotion attribution. 
Brain region BA Cluster 
Sizea 
t-value  
(df = 17)b 
x,y,z (mm)c 
Unfulfilled Neutral Intention vs Reality     
Pre-supplementary motor area 6 109 5.67g  14, 12, 52 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 151 5.73f  -52, 18, -2 
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 9 237 5.50e -28, 48, 38 
Fulfilled Immoral Intention vs Reality     
Pre-supplementary motor area 6 592 5.70d -6, 16, 64 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 319 4.85e -44, 32, -6 
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 9 170 4.79f -28, 52, 34 
Right Insula /  
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
13/45 168 5.25f 38, 12, 8 
Unfulfilled Immoral Intention vs Reality     
Dorsal paracingulate cortex 32 462 4.98d 8, 24, 40 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 287 6.00e -52, 18, -4 
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 9 233 5.65e -32, 48, 34 
Right Insula 13 331 7.40d 38, 12, 6 
Notes: BA, Brodmann’s areas are approximate.  
 a Numbers of activated voxels per cluster.  
 b Peak t-value in activated cluster, df = degrees of freedom. 
 c Peak coordinate of activated cluster according to the Montreal Neurological  
 Institute (MNI) atlas. 
 d Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤.001 (corrected). 
 e  Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤ .01 (corrected). 
 f Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤.05 (corrected).  
 g Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤ .01 (uncorrected).
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Further, the main effect of intention revealed that emotions inferred from immoral 
compared to neutral intentions was associated with functional activity in the dorsal 
paracingulate cortex (BA 32, Tab. 7.8), the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 
47), and the visual cortex (BA 18/19). There was no brain region that showed a 
significant difference in brain activity for emotions inferred from neutral compared 
to immoral intentions. In addition, no brain region showed a main effect for the 
factor ‘intention-outcome-relation’. 
 
 
Table 7.8: Brain regions showing significant functional signal changes associated with the 
main effect of intention. 
Brain region BA Cluster  
Sizea 
t-value  
(df = 17)b 
x,y,z (mm)c 
Immoral vs Neutral Intention     
Dorsal paracingulate cortex 32 314 6.28d 8, 38, 22 
Right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 148 6.53e 42, 20, -14 
Left middle occipital cortex 19 227 5.18d -50, -76, 2 
Cuneus 18 133 5.42e -12, -96, 10 
Notes: BA, Brodmann’s areas are approximate. 
 a Numbers of activated voxels per cluster.  
 b Peak t-value in activated cluster, df = degrees of freedom. 
 c Peak coordinate of activated cluster according to the Montreal Neurological  
 Institute (MNI) atlas.  
 d Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤ .01 (corrected). 
 e  Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤ .05 (corrected). 
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This study was mainly interested in brain regions showing an intention by intention-
outcome-relation interaction effect. The interaction analysis showed significant 
effects in the pre-supplementary-motor area (pre-SMA, BA 6) and the bilateral 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC; left: BA 47; right: BA 45, Tab. 7.9). For 
these brain regions the t-test analysis showed a significant signal increase associated 
with emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions compared to fulfilled 
neutral intentions (Tab. 7.10; BA 6: Fig. 7.5; BA 47: Fig. 7.6; BA 45: Fig. 7.7). No 
other t-contrast dependent on the factors intention and intention-outcome-relation 
had a significant impact on functional activity in the pre-SMA and the bilateral 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. 
 
Table 7.9: Brain regions showing significant functional signal changes associated with 
intention by intention-outcome relation interaction effects. 
Brain region BA Cluster 
Sizea 
F-value  
(df = 1,85) b 
x,y,z (mm)c 
Pre-supplementary motor area 6 16 12.76 6, 20 , 54 
Right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 45 17 13.38 54, 24, 18 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex  47 137 17.71 -48, 32 , 2 
Notes: BA, Brodmann’s areas are approximate. 
 a Numbers of activated voxels per cluster.  
 b Peak t-value in activated cluster, df = degrees of freedom. 
 c Peak coordinate of activated cluster according to the Montreal Neurological  
 Institute (MNI) atlas.  
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Table 7.10: Post-hoc t-test results in brain regions showing significant functional signal 
changes associated with the intention by intention-outcome-relation interaction. 
Brain region BA Cluster  
Sizea 
t-value  
(df = 17)b 
x,y,z (mm)c 
Fulfilled Intention: Immoral vs Neutral     
Pre-supplementary motor area 6 152 5.10d -4, 22, 66 
Right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 45 144 4.78d 54, 22, 8 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex  47 166 4.41d -52, 18, -4 
Notes: BA, Brodmann’s areas are approximate. 
 a Numbers of activated voxels per cluster.  
 b Peak t-value in activated cluster, df = degrees of freedom. 
 c Peak coordinate of activated cluster according to the Montreal Neurological  
 Institute (MNI) atlas.  
 d Brain region satisfies a statistical cluster threshold of p ≤ .05 (corrected). 
 106
  Study II – Results 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 107
(B) Fulfilled Intention 
Unfulfilled Intention 
(A) 
Fig. 7.5: (A) Functional changes in the amplitude of the HRF in the medial pre-
supplementary motor area (BA 6) associated with an intention by intention-outcome-
relation interaction effect. (B) Post-hoc t-tests showed an activity increase for fulfilled 
immoral compared to fulfilled neutral intentions. BA, Brodmann’s areas are 
approximate. 
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(A) 
Unfulfilled Intention 
Fulfilled Intention (B) 
Fig. 7.6: (A) Functional changes in the amplitude of the HRF in the left ventrolateral  
prefrontal cortex (BA 47) associated with an intention by intention-outcome-relation 
interaction effect. (B) Post-hoc t-tests showed an activity increase for fulfilled immoral 
compared to fulfilled neutral intentions. BA, Brodmann’s areas are approximate. 
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Fig. 7.7: (A) Functional changes in the amplitude of the HRF in the right ventrolateral  
prefrontal cortex (BA 45) associated with an intention by intention-outcome-relation 
interaction effect. (B) Post-hoc t-tests showed an activity increase for fulfilled immoral 
compared to fulfilled neutral intentions. Brodmann’s areas are approximate. 
 
(B) Fulfilled Intention 
Unfulfilled Intention 
(A) 
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8. DISCUSSION 
STUDY II 
EMOTIONS INFERRED FROM THE INTEGRATION OF IMMORAL 
INTENTIONS INTO INTENTION-OUTCOME-RELATIONS 
 
 
This thesis investigated the neural network involved in intention-based emotion 
attribution. While the first study explored emotion attribution based on intention-
outcome-relations, the second experiment aimed at investigating emotion attribution 
based on the integration of an actor’s immoral intention into intention-outcome-
relations. In the emotion attribution conditions a protagonist’s neutral or immoral 
intention either matched or mismatched the outcome of the intended action. Further, 
a paralleled non-mental control condition was used. Chapter 8.1 discusses the 
behavioural findings, followed by the discussion of the functional findings (chapter 
8.2) and a summary (chapter 8.3). 
 
8.1 Behavioural findings 
First, more negative emotions such as embarrassment and sadness were attributed in 
relation to immoral compared to neutral intentions, irrespective of the intention-
outcome-relation. Second, the attribution of positive emotions varied with both the 
actor’s intention and the intention-outcome-relation. That is, particularly in the case 
of fulfilled immoral intentions, an intermediate intensity of happiness, pride, and 
satisfaction was attributed. Moreover, the fulfilment of an immoral intention resulted 
in attributing the greatest intensity of the more immoral emotion schadenfreude. 
Therefore, specifically in the case of fulfilled immoral intentions, a mixture of 
different emotions was attributed: negative emotions and subdued positive emotions 
on the one hand, and the greatest amount of schadenfreude on the other hand. The 
results, therefore, may indicate that adults particularly attribute mixed emotions in 
cases where immoral intentions are fulfilled. This interpretation is supported by 
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developmental findings which also observed the attribution of mixed emotions in 
relation to transgression scenarios during adulthood (Lagattuta, 2005). 
Moreover, the results show that while the intensity of positive emotion 
attributions was a function of both other’s immoral intentions and the intention-
outcome-relation, the attribution of the negative emotions sadness and 
embarrassment was not affected by the interaction of theses factors. These findings 
suggest that, at least in adulthood, the intensity of positive, probably more goal-
oriented emotions may be affected by the integration of immoral intentions into 
intention-outcome-relations. In contrast, the intensity of negative, probably more 
moral emotions seems to remain constant. This interpretation is supported by a 
developmental study which observed that during adolescence the intensity of the 
moral emotion guilt that was attributed to a victimizer remained stable irrespective of 
an onlooker’s emotional reaction. In contrast, the intensity of positive emotions 
decreased with a disapproving onlooker compared to a mistakenly pleased onlooker 
(Murgatroyd & Robinson, 1997). 
 
8.2 Neuroimaging findings 
This study aimed at investigating the functional basis associated with emotions 
inferred from the integration of immoral intentions into the processing of intention-
outcome-relations. As was expected, such interaction effects were found in the pre-
SMA (BA 6) and the bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC, BA 45/47). 
These brain regions showed an activity increase associated with emotions inferred 
from unfulfilled immoral intentions compared to fulfilled neutral intentions.  
First, the pre-SMA activity increase associated with emotions inferred from 
fulfilled immoral intentions is supported by other studies showing that the pre-SMA 
is involved in the processing of intentional transgression (Berthoz et al., 2002; Finger 
et al., 2006). Further, in study one of this thesis, the pre-SMA activity was observed 
to be associated with emotions inferred from intention-outcome-relations. Based on 
this result, it was argued that even adults seem to infer others’ emotions by matching 
their intention to the outcome situation rather than by processing it independent of 
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reality cues (chapter 4.2.1). The present results extend the previous findings by 
suggesting that also immoral intentions, particularly fulfilled immoral intentions, 
may be processed in relation to situational cues rather than being processed 
independent of reality cues. Further, as argued in chapter 4.2.1, the pre-SMA plays 
an important role in the inhibition of automatic responses (Mostofsky & Simmonds, 
2008). Therefore, for emotion attribution based on fulfilled immoral intentions, the 
pre-SMA activity increase indicates that participants may have suppressed an 
automatic intention-outcome-match response, which is probably based on a goal-
oriented intention-outcome-matching strategy (e.g., feeling good = the intention to 
reach a goal matches the outcome). Instead, as indexed by the attribution of mixed 
emotions, participants may have given a more controlled intention-outcome-match 
response, which may have been based on simultaneously computing a goal-oriented 
and a morally-oriented intention-outcome-matching strategy (e.g., feeling mixed 
emotions = the intention to reach a goal matches a goal-oriented outcome + the 
intention not to harm mismatches a morally-oriented outcome).  
This interpretation is further supported by the activity increase in the bilateral 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 45 and BA 47) associated with emotion 
attribution based on fulfilled immoral intentions compared to fulfilled neutral 
intentions. As described before in chapter 4.2.3, while the anterior VLPFC (BA 47) 
is supposed to be involved in the controlled access to stored conceptual 
representations, the mid-VLPFC (BA 45) is argued to support a domain-general 
selection process that operates post-retrieval to resolve competition among active 
representations (Badre & Wagner, 2007). Therefore, the present findings suggest that 
the controlled intention-outcome-matching strategy that is assumed to underlie 
emotion attribution based on fulfilled immoral intentions may have been based on 
both script retrieval and on resolving a conflict between a more goal-oriented (e.g., 
‘people feel good when their intentions match the outcome’) and a more morally-
oriented script (e.g., ‘people feel sad when they cause harm’). 
Interestingly and contrary to expectation, the present results revealed an activity 
increase in the pre-SMA for emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions with 
no additional recruitment of brain regions implicated in representational operations, 
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particularly the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC). This negative finding, 
however, is not consistent with other studies which observed, in addition to an 
increase in premotor activity, a DMPFC activity increase for emotions inferred from 
intentional versus unintentional transgression trials (Berthoz et al., 2002; Finger et 
al., 2006). The diverging findings could be due to differences with respect to an 
explicit versus implicit presentation of the protagonist’s intention. While in the 
present study the actor’s intention was explicitly stated, in previous studies the 
actor’s intention was not explicitly presented, and therefore had to be indirectly 
inferred from the actor’s behaviour. Therefore, the present results indicate that when 
intentions are explicitly stated, the integration of an actor’s immoral intention into 
the processing of intention-outcome-relations may be solely based on intention-
outcome-matching strategies without additionally processing other’s immoral 
intentions independent of reality cues. In contrast, in cases where participants cannot 
simply rely on intention-outcome-matching strategies, the recruitment of those brain 
regions may be necessary that are involved in representational operations. This 
assumption is supported by a recent study on the neural network involved in the 
interaction between false belief reasoning and moral judgements in intention-
outcome-scenarios (Young et al., 2007). In this study, the intention-outcome-relation 
was made explicit. Interestingly, while the rostral MPFC was found to be involved in 
attempted harm trials where the victimizer’s behaviour was based on a false belief 
about reality, it was not involved in intended harm scenes where the victimizer did 
not hold a false belief about reality. 
Contrary to study one, in study two the activity in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex did not vary with the experimental conditions. This negative finding is likely 
due to differences in the duration of the emotion attribution trials, on which the 
analysis focused (study 1: 6 sec, study 2: 3 sec). As argued in chapter 4.2.4, the 
VMPFC signal decrease associated with emotion attribution, which was observed in 
study one, was supposed to be associated with a disengagement from self-referential 
processes towards task-related processes. Because subjects in study two had only 
half the time to reason about others’ emotions, this may have prevented them from 
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engaging in self-referential processes, and, as a consequence, the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex may not have been recruited.  
 
8.3 Summary 
The behavioural results confirm that adults attribute mixed emotions based on 
fulfilled immoral intentions. Furthermore, particularly the intensity of positive, 
probably goal-oriented emotions seems to be affected by the integration of immoral 
intentions into intention-outcome-matches. In contrast, the intensity of negative, 
probably more moral emotions seems to remain constant, irrespective of the 
fulfilment of an immoral intention. As was expected, similar information processes 
would be associated with emotion attribution based on simple intention-outcome-
relations and emotion attribution based on the integration of immoral intentions into 
intention-outcome-relations. The pre-SMA activity suggests that even in situations 
where subjects have to infer mixed emotions based on fulfilled immoral intentions, 
they likely process the immoral intention in relation to the outcome situation rather 
than processing an actor’s immoral intention independent of reality cues. That is, 
particularly in the case of attributing mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral 
intentions participants may have given a more controlled intention-outcome-match 
response which may have been based on simultaneously computing a goal-oriented 
and a morally-oriented intention-outcome-matching strategy. This intention-
outcome-matching strategy, however, seems to be restricted to cases where other’s 
intentions are explicitly stated, as indexed by the negative finding with respect to 
DMPFC recruitment. Further, it was argued that the intention-outcome-matching 
strategy, which is assumed to rely predominately on pre-SMA activity, may also be 
based on script retrieval, as indexed by the anterior VLPFC activity (BA 47). In 
addition, particularly for the processing of mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled 
immoral intentions, a conflict between a more goal-oriented and a more morally-
oriented script may have been resolved post-retrieval, as indexed by the mid-VLPFC 
activity (BA 45).  
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9. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
The ability to infer another person’s emotions from his or her intention is shortly 
acquired around the ability to understand false beliefs, the key ToM ability. False 
belief understanding is supposed to be an indicator of representational understanding. 
This thesis was the first extending research on the neural network involved in Theory 
of Mind (ToM) to intention-based emotion attribution. Based on developmental and 
neuronal findings, it was assumed that emotions inferred from intention-outcome-
relations would be less associated with brain regions implicated in representational 
operations, particularly the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and the 
temporo-parietal-junction (TPJ). In contrast, specifically emotions inferred from 
fulfilled immoral intentions were assumed to be associated with brain regions 
involved in representational operations, specifically the DMPFC. Two experiments 
were conducted. Experiment 1 investigated emotion attribution based on intention-
outcome-relations, an ability which precedes the ability to understand false beliefs. 
Experiment 2 was concerned with emotion attribution based on the integration of 
immoral intentions into intention-outcome-relations, an ability which develops 
shortly after false belief understanding.  
First, neither the DMPFC nor the TPJ were observed to be involved in intention-
based emotion attribution. This finding indicates that adults may attribute emotions, 
even mixed emotions in the case of fulfilled immoral intentions, without 
representational operations. Moreover, a similar neural network was observed when 
emotions were inferred from intention-outcome-relations and when emotions were 
inferred by integrating immoral intentions into intention-outcome-relations. This 
network particularly comprised the medial pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA, 
BA 6) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC, BA 45/47). This network was 
specifically active during emotion attribution based on unfulfilled intentions and on 
fulfilled immoral intentions. Regarding the pre-SMA activity, intention-based 
emotion attribution may be associated with a controlled intention-outcome-matching 
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strategy. That is, at least in adulthood, emotions may be inferred by a controlled 
matching of an intention to an outcome situation, rather than by processing the 
intention independent of reality cues. More specifically, in the case of unfulfilled 
intentions, participants may have suppressed an automatic intention-outcome-
matching response based on an expected intention-outcome-match situation. Instead, 
subjects may have adjusted the automatic intention-outcome-matching response to an 
unexpected intention-outcome-mismatch situation. Moreover, in the case of 
attributing mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions, participants 
may have simultaneously computed a goal-oriented and a morally-oriented intention-
outcome-matching strategy. The assumption of a controlled intention-outcome-
matching strategy in cases where either an intention mismatches an outcome 
situation, or where an immoral intention induces a mismatch between a goal-oriented 
and a morally-oriented intention-outcome-matching response, is further supported by 
anterior and mid-VLPFC activity. The VLPFC activity suggests that particularly for 
negative emotions inferred from unfulfilled intentions and for mixed emotions 
inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions, it may have been necessary to retrieve 
scripts in a controlled information processing modus, as indexed by the anterior 
VLPFC activity (BA 47). Moreover, specifically for the processing of mixed 
emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions, adults may have resolved a 
conflict between a more goal-oriented and a more morally-oriented script, as indexed 
by the mid-VLPFC activity (BA 45). 
In sum, the functional findings on emotions inferred from intention-outcome-
relations indicate that even adult participants may have matched an actor’s intention 
to an outcome situation rather than processing its intention, even its unfulfilled 
intention independent of reality cues. Therefore, intention-based emotion attribution, 
at least for neutral intentions, does not seem to require representational operations. 
Further, the functional findings on emotion attribution based on the integration of an 
immoral intention into intention-outcome-relations challenge developmental 
findings. Developmental evidence indicates that young children’s happy victimizer 
responses based on fulfilled immoral intentions are a function of an immature 
representational understanding. The neuronal adult data speak against the assumption 
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of representational operations underlying emotion attribution for immoral intentions. 
Instead, at least in adults, the neuronal findings suggest that the processing of mixed 
emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions may be a function of an 
increasing ability to simultaneously compute diverging intention-outcome-matching 
strategies and to simultaneously process diverging intention-based emotion 
attribution scripts, rather than being a function of representational operations. To 
further test this assumption, a developmental study should investigate the brain 
regions associated with intention-based emotion attribution. Further, subsequent 
research should combine research on false belief understanding and intention-based 
emotion attribution by exploring the neural network involved in belief-based emotion 
attribution compared to intention-based emotion attribution. 
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10. SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis extends research on the neural network involved in Theory of Mind 
(ToM) to intention-based emotion attribution. Children acquire this ability around the 
ability to understand false beliefs. False belief understanding is the key ToM ability 
because of indicating representational understanding. Two experiments were 
conducted. In both experiments cartoon stories with verbal vignettes were presented. 
The experimental conditions only differed in their verbal vignettes. In experiment 1 
fifteen healthy adults reasoned about emotions inferred from intention-outcome-
relations, an ability which develops shortly before the acquirement of false belief 
understanding. In experiment 2 eighteen healthy adults attributed emotions based on 
integrating an actor’s immoral intention into intention-outcome-relations, an ability 
that develops shortly after the development of false belief understanding. Based on 
developmental and neuronal findings, it was assumed that emotions inferred from 
intention-outcome-relations would be less associated with brain regions implicated in 
representational operations, in particular the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex 
(DMPFC) and the temporo-parietal-junction (TPJ). In contrast, specifically emotions 
inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions were assumed to be associated with brain 
regions involved in representational operations, specifically the DMPFC. In 
Experiment 1 the emotion attribution conditions varied depending on an actor’s 
intention either matching or mismatching an outcome situation. In Experiment 2, in 
addition to the factor intention-outcome-relation, an actor either held a neutral or 
immoral intention (factor intention). In the emotion attribution picture following the 
story pictures, which depict an actor’s intention and an outcome situation, subjects 
had to reason about the actor’s emotion based on its intention and the outcome of the 
intended action. The fMRI analysis focused on the functional activity associated with 
the emotion attribution cue. The emotion attribution picture was followed by a 
response picture presenting different emotion dimensions (Experiment 1: neutral, 
positive, negative; Experiment 2: positive, negative). Besides the emotion attribution 
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conditions, a non-mental reality judgement condition was used. Following the fMRI 
session, a rating task with different emotion dimensions was conducted to get more 
specific emotion attribution results. Neither the DMPFC nor the TPJ was involved in 
intention-based emotion attribution. Instead, a neuronal network specifically 
comprising the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) was associated with negative emotions inferred from 
unfulfilled intentions (experiment 1) and with mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled 
immoral intentions (experiment 2). These findings indicate that intention-based 
emotion attribution, including the processing of mixed emotions inferred from 
fulfilled immoral intentions, may be a function of an increasing ability to 
simultaneously compute diverging intention-outcome-matching strategies and to 
simultaneously process diverging intention-based emotion attribution scripts, rather 
than being a function of representational operations. 
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